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We show that the problem of reconstructing encrypted databases from access pattern
leakage is closely related to statistical learning theory. This new viewpoint enables us to
develop broader attacks that are supported by streamlined performance analyses. As an
introduction to this viewpoint, we first present a general reduction from reconstruction with
known queries to PAC learning. Then, we directly address the problem of ε-approximate
database reconstruction (ε-ADR) from range query leakage, giving attacks whose query
cost scales only with the relative error ε, and is independent of the size of the database,
or the number N of possible values of data items. This already goes significantly beyond
the state of the art for such attacks, as represented by Kellaris et al. (ACM CCS 2016)
and Lacharité et al. (IEEE S&P 2018). We also study the new problem of ε-approximate
order reconstruction (ε-AOR), where the adversary is tasked with reconstructing the order
of records, except for records whose values are approximately equal. We show that as few as
O(ε−1 log ε−1) uniformly random range queries suffice. Our analysis relies on an application
of learning theory to PQ-trees, special data structures tuned to compactly record certain
ordering constraints. We then show that when an auxiliary distribution is available, ε-
AOR can be enhanced to achieve ε-ADR; using real data, we show that devastatingly small
numbers of queries are needed to attain very accurate database reconstruction. Finally,
we generalize from ranges to consider what learning theory tells us about the impact of
access pattern leakage for other classes of queries, focusing on prefix and suffix queries. We
illustrate this with both concrete attacks for prefix queries and with a general lower bound
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1 Introduction
This article concerns the analysis of leakage from encrypted databases. The latter are cryptographic
techniques that allow a client to outsource a database to an untrusted server while maintaining the
ability to make queries on the data. Fuller et al. [FVY+17] give a comprehensive survey of this area.
All known techniques represent a trade-off between security and efficiency, with various forms of leakage
being intrinsic to these approaches. For example, without taking special precautions such as using
oblivious memory techniques, the access pattern, that is, the set of records returned in response to
queries, leaks to the server. While in many cases, formal security proofs are able to establish that
nothing more than the access pattern leaks to the adversarial server, there still remains the question:
what is the practical impact of this leakage? A more refined version of the question is:
If an encrypted database supports a certain class of queries, but leaks the access
pattern, then how damaging is that leakage as a function of the number of
queries?
The setting of this article is one in which only access pattern is leaked to an adversarial server. Access
pattern leakage is inherent to nearly all practical constructions of encrypted databases, and the survey
by Fuller et al. [FVY+17] overviews a plethora of schemes to which such attacks apply. In the particular
case of range queries, all known practical solutions leak this information [LMP18]. Nevertheless, the
above question is currently answered using ad hoc cryptanalysis, requiring cumbersome and laborious
analyses to establish the impact of leakage as a function of the number of queries. The central aim of
our work is to transform this situation by bringing statistical learning theory to bear on the problem.
1.1 Database Reconstruction: State of the Art
Range queries are fundamental to the operation of databases, and have rightfully received significant
attention in the attack literature. The state of the art for attacks based on leakage from range queries is
represented by the work of Kellaris-Kollios-Nissim-O’Neill (KKNO) [KKNO16] and Lacharité-Minaud-
Paterson (LMP) [LMP18]. KKNO gave attacks showing that O(N4 logN) queries suffice to achieve
Full Database Reconstruction (FDR), that is, to reconstruct the exact value for every record. Here, N
is the number of different possible values, which we assume without loss of generality come from the
interval [1, N ]. For dense data, where every possible value is in at least one record, this was improved
to O(N2 logN) queries by KKNO and then to O(N logN) queries by LMP. All of these results assume
the query distribution is uniform on ranges (though for the results in the dense setting, this assumption
is needed only to facilitate analysis and not for the algorithms to succeed).
A typical value of N might be, say, 125 for data pertaining to age in years, making even an
O(N4 logN) attack potentially worrisome. But for many data types, N can be much larger – think of
discrete data such as numerical zip codes, timestamps, or salary data. For large N , especially when the
data is sparse rather than dense (as is typically the case), FDR is much too expensive (KKNO proved a
general lower bound of Ω(N4) on the number of range queries needed), and really too strong an attack
goal.
For this reason, LMP introduced the notion of ε-Approximate Database Reconstruction (ε-ADR),
where the adversary’s goal is to find the value of every record up to an (additive) error of εN rather
than exactly. For small ε, such an attack is still extremely effective: imagine learning all salaries in
a database up to an error of 1%. LMP gave the first algorithm for ε-ADR. Their algorithm achieves
ε-ADR from access pattern leakage on only O(N · log ε−1) queries. However, it still requires a density
assumption and its analysis is highly complex.
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1.2 Overview of Our Contributions
None of the aforementioned attacks exploiting range query leakage is fully satisfactory: FDR is too
expensive for large N , while the only ADR algorithm we have (from LMP’s work [LMP18]) relies on
a density assumption and its query cost still scales with N . This presents a potentially misleading
picture of the impact of leakage for range queries, one which may lead to underestimating the potential
damage. Additionally, leakage from other kinds of queries has received little attention; nor have other
attack settings of practical importance such as known-query attacks.
In this work, we show how statistical learning theory effectively addresses the problem of database
reconstruction, yielding new results across a range of settings. A common thread through all of our
results is the analysis of concept spaces over the set of all queries. The results we apply from learning
theory rely on the VC dimension of the concept space, intuitively a measure of how complex it is. (See
Section 2 for a short primer on statistical learning theory.)
PAC learning and known-query attacks. In Section 3, we show that database reconstruction given
a set of known queries can be recast as an instance of Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning,
and standard results from that field can predict how many queries are needed to achieve reconstruction.
We present this reduction to PAC learning as an introduction to how we view database reconstruction
as a learning problem, as well as an illustration of the power of this viewpoint. While the attack model
here is rather powerful, it is considered realistic in some recent literature [ZKP16, GSB+17, GMN+16];
our analysis largely resolves the question of how damaging such attacks can be. In the remainder, we
no longer assume queries are known, aligning our setting with most prior work.
Sacrificial ε-ADR. In Section 4, we present two new ε-ADR algorithms for range queries. These
attacks are scale-free: their query complexity depends not on the number of possible values N , but
only the precision ε. They accommodate any number of queries, as opposed to the “all-or-nothing”
attacks of KKNO and LMP. To obtain scale-freeness, we must sacrifice recovering some records near
the endpoints. As we explain in Section 4.1, scale-free ε-ADR is impossible in general – for example,
O(N) uniformly random range queries are necessary to recover values near the endpoints 1 and N , so
we must sacrifice these.
The first algorithm (Section 4.2), whose analysis is somewhat simpler, achieves sacrificial ε-ADR
using O(ε−4 log ε−1) uniformly random range queries. Setting ε = 1/N yields an FDR attack with the
same complexity as KKNO’s original FDR attack. Indeed, our algorithm can be seen as generalizing
the ideas of KKNO to the ADR setting, and making it scale-free. In Section 4.3, we introduce our
second attack, the ApproxValue algorithm, which achieves sacrificial ε-ADR using only O(ε−2 log ε−1)
uniformly random queries, but under the additional, mild requirement that the database contains a
record whose value is in the range [0.2N, 0.3N ] (or its reflection). Setting ε = 1/N in our algorithm
again yields a FDR algorithm with complexity O(N2 logN) that works whether data is sparse or dense,
assuming only a single favorably-located record. Our proof techniques for both attacks are rooted in
learning theory, using VC dimension and the concept of ε-samples. Both attacks also come with general
lower bounds showing that they are optimal in the number of queries needed within a logarithmic factor.
In order to assess the effectiveness of these algorithms and the tightness of our bounds, we implement
our attacks and experiment on synthetic data (Section 4.4). For example, if N = 106 and the condition
of the ApproxValue algorithm is met, KKNO’s FDR attack would require about 1026 queries. We
found experimentally that only 500 queries (or 24 orders of magnitude fewer than KKNO) are needed
to approximate almost all records to within 5% error.
Lifting requirements on the query distribution. In view of the previous attacks, it may seem
that the topic of analyzing leakage from range queries is mostly closed, but these attacks require that
the adversary knows the query distribution, and crucially rely on the assumption that queries are drawn
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independently and uniformly at random. This second requirement especially makes little sense for real-
world queries, and we contend that practical attacks should not require it. In this regard, we view
KKNO’s work and our aforementioned results as important indicators of what is possible in principle,
and valuable warnings regarding the power of range query leakage, but not as practical, ready-for-use
attacks.
The question, then, is what an attacker can hope to learn in practice, given only the access pattern
leakage of some range queries. We investigate this question in Section 5, focusing on attacks that do
not rely on any assumptions regarding the query distribution: whereas the attack algorithms so far
required a distribution that is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), uniform, and known to
the adversary, in Section 5 we remove all three assumptions. The LMP results already represent a step
in this direction, since their algorithms are not distribution-dependent. However, they do require that
the database is dense, whereas we wish to investigate this question in the general setting.
Sacrificial ε-AOR. In Section 5, we introduce the attack target of sacrificial ε-Approximate Order
Reconstruction (sacrificial ε-AOR). This asks that the order of all records should be recovered, except
for records that are within εN of each other (which the algorithm groups), and the sacrificed records
whose values are within εN of 1 or N . Thus, save for sacrificed values, sacrificial ε-AOR reveals the
order of any two records as soon as they are at least εN apart.
As our main result in Section 5, we introduce the ApproxOrder algorithm, which takes as input
the access pattern leakage of some range queries, builds a PQ-tree, and extracts from it approximate
order information. The algorithm does not use any knowledge on the query distribution. In particular,
it does not require uniformly random queries, nor even i.i.d. queries. If, for the sake of analyzing the
algorithm, we assume a uniform query distribution, ApproxOrder achieves sacrificial ε-AOR after
only O(ε−1 log ε−1) queries. Once again, our analysis relies on learning theory, more specifically the
concept of an ε-net, and shows that the attack is scale-free. We also prove that the query complexity
of our algorithm is optimal within a constant factor.
For ε = 1/N , ε-AOR yields exact order reconstruction for all records. If the database is dense,
then recovering order directly implies recovering values, so we obtain full database reconstruction in
O(N logN) queries, recovering as a special case the main result of LMP.
The ApproxOrder algorithm is not merely theoretical, but highly practical. There is no barrier
(such as an i.i.d. query assumption) to running it on real data. Our experiments in Section 5.4 show
that the attack behaves as predicted by the theory. As an example, for N = 106, after only 500 queries,
the attack is able to fully order records, except for records whose difference in value is less than 2% of
the support size.
From ε-AOR to ε-ADR. A crucial question remains: what are the implications of the AOR attack?
That is, what does learning approximate order reveal to the attacker? It is well known that leaking
record order is highly damaging, if only because it can be closely correlated to record values using an
auxiliary distribution [NKW15, GSB+17]. In fact, the severe implications of order leakage is one of
the main motivations behind the development of second-generation encrypted databases schemes that
attempt to hide that leakage, as argued in [LMP18]. To concretize that point, in Section 5.5 we present
an attack showing how approximate database values can be reconstructed from approximate order
information: we extend our sacrificial ε-AOR attack to a sacrificial ε-ADR attack using an auxiliary
model of the database distribution. (As per [NKW15, LMP18], such distributions are often available.)
We conduct experiments with real datasets of US ZIP codes and public sector salaries in Section 5.5.
The resulting sacrificial ε-ADR attack is effective: with only 50 queries, we can learn the first two digits
of a ZIP code (often identifying a city) for a majority of records in the target database. With 100
queries on salaries, we can predict a majority of salaries to within 10000 USD. The table in Figure 1
compares our different attacks on range queries.
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Beyond range queries. As illustration of the power of the viewpoint we have taken, in Section 6,
we generalize approximate reconstruction to other query classes and analyze the resulting attacks using
tools from learning theory. Using generalization error as a metric γ on the values in the database, we
show that all query classes with finite VC dimension reveal the distance (in γ) between the underlying
values of records, which allows an attacker to group records whose values are close. Further, we show
how to use an ε-net to precisely analyze how many queries are needed to guarantee all groups of
records have small diameter according to γ. We construct, analyze, and evaluate the first reconstruction
attack on prefix queries. We conclude the section with a general lower bound, via a reduction to PAC
learning, relating the query class’s VC dimension, attack accuracy, and number of queries needed for
any reconstruction attack using access pattern leakage. In addition to being of theoretical interest,
this suggests VC dimension or similar concepts from learning theory could be a useful way to compare
different techniques which leak access patterns.
Notation. Throughout [n] denotes the set of integers {1, . . . , n}; [a, b] denotes the set of integers
within the given interval; and open brackets such as [a, b[ denote that the corresponding endpoint is
excluded. (If b ≤ a, [a, b[ is empty.) We model a database as a set of R records where each record has a
single attribute that takes an integer value in [N ]. We let val(r) ∈ [N ] denote the value of the record r.
Assumptions. We assume the adversary knows the number of possible values N , and the set of all
possible queries. We do not assume that the adversary knows the set of all records in advance, or
even their number. We do not assume that every value appears in at least one record (no density
assumption).
The ApproxValue algorithm in Section 4 further assumes that queries are drawn i.i.d. and uni-
formly at random. The attack and its analysis can be generalized to other query distributions. As
explained earlier, we then introduce the ApproxOrder algorithm in Section 5 precisely to do away
with assumptions on the query distribution. Likewise all algorithms in Section 6 function without such
assumptions. When it comes to analyzing the query complexity of those algorithms, we are forced to
make a hypothesis on the query distribution. In that case, we choose an assumption about the query
distribution that helps provide insight into a typical behavior of the algorithm. We stress that that
hypothesis is in no way required for the algorithm to function and succeed.
1.3 Related Work
Dautrich Jr. and Ravishankar [JR13] introduced the use of PQ-trees in revealing the order of records in a
database with access pattern leakage. They experimentally measured, in some special cases, how quickly
the number of orders contained in the tree decreases as more queries are gathered. We use also use
PQ-trees for revealing order from range queries, but otherwise our aims are distinct from theirs—their
paper focuses primarily on heuristic measures of security after some ordering information is revealed.
Kellaris et al. (KKNO) [KKNO16] described the first exact reconstruction attack on range queries
with access pattern leakage; Lacharité et al. (LMP) [LMP18] improved the results of KKNO in the
dense setting, obtaining an O(N logN) exact reconstruction attack; see Section 1.1 for more detail.
Kornaropoulos et al. [KPT18] gave an approximate reconstruction attack for access pattern leakage from
k-nearest-neighbor queries. Other papers attacking encrypted databases include [GSB+17, NKW15,
BGC+18, GMN+16, CGPR15]; these mostly analyze so-called “property-revealing encryption” schemes,
which leak strictly more than what we assume.
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Query complexity
Attack Goal Data density Proposed attack Generic lower bound Source
KKNO FDR any O(N4 logN) Ω(N4) [KKNO16]
KKNO FDR dense O(N2 logN) – [KKNO16]
LMP FDR dense N logN +O(N) 12N logN −O(N) [LMP18]
LMP ε-ADR dense 54N log ε
−1 +O(N) N log ε−1 −O(N) [LMP18]
GeneralizedKKNO sacrificial ε-ADR any O(ε−4 log ε−1) Ω(ε−4) Section 4.2
ApproxValue sacrificial ε-ADR any∗ O(ε−2 log ε−1) Ω(ε−2) Section 4.3
ApproxOrder sacrificial ε-AOR any∗ O(ε−1 log ε−1) Ω(ε−1 log ε−1) Section 5
Figure 1: Comparison of database reconstruction attacks that use access pattern leakage from range
queries chosen uniformly at random. N is the number of possible plaintext values. All attacks are
up to global reflection. Generic lower bounds are for any attack targeting the same goal under the
same assumptions. “∗” denotes some additional but mild requirements on the existence of records with
particular values.
2 Statistical Learning Theory Primer
We begin with a brief introduction to some elements of statistical learning theory that will play a central
role in our work. We use terminology from a recent textbook [MU17].
2.1 Concept Spaces, ε-Nets, ε-Samples
Let X be some set of (base) elements. In this work, X is always finite (although our scale-free recon-
struction bounds extend to infinite sets, e.g. continuous ranges, as is). A concept (also called event
or range) C is a subset of X. Given a probability distribution D on the set X, let fD represent the
probability mass function. The probability PrD(C) of a concept C is equal to the probability that a
single element of X sampled according to D is in C, i.e., PrD(C) =
∑
c∈C fD(c).
A concept space (or set system) is a pair (X,C) where C is a set of concepts (subsets) of X. Any
concept C can also be viewed as a function X → {0, 1} (its characteristic function): the function’s
output on input x ∈ X is 1 if x ∈ C and 0 otherwise. Given a concept space (X,C) and a sample S of
elements drawn from X according to D, we may ask the following questions:
• Does every concept in C with some not-too-small probability occur in the sample S?
• Is the relative occurrence of every concept of C in the sample S close to its expectation?
Answering these questions involves analyzing objects called ε-nets [HW86] and ε-samples.
Definition 2.1. A subset S ⊆ X is an ε-net for the concept space (X,C) with respect to the distribution
D if for every event C ∈ C with PrD(C) ≥ ε, the intersection S ∩ C is non-empty.
Definition 2.2. A subset S ⊆ X is an ε-sample (also called ε-approximation) for the concept space
(X,C) with respect to the distribution D if for every concept C ∈ C,∣∣∣∣ |S ∩ C||S| − PrD(C)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
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Informally, a sample S is an ε-sample when every concept’s relative frequency in S is within ε of its
true probability. It is an ε-net iff every concept of probability at least ε occurs in the sample.
One way to analyze when a set S is an ε-net or an ε-sample is to characterize the complexity of the
concept space. We turn to this next.
2.2 Shattering, VC Dimension, Growth Functions
The critical measures in determining the complexity of a concept space are the growth function mC(n)
and the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension d, which are related. Given a concept space (X,C) and
a finite sample S ⊆ X, an important object is the set of subsamples of S induced by C (also called the
projection of C on S): CS := {C ∩ S}C∈C. The size of this set is the index of C with respect to S:
∆C(S) := |CS | = |{C ∩ S : C ∈ C}| .
Clearly, the index of a concept space relative to a set S is at most 2|S|, and, when C is finite, it is at
most |C|.
The concept space (X,C) shatters the sample S ⊆ X if C induces all possible subsamples of S, i.e.,
∆C(S) = 2
|S|.
The VC dimension (also called density [Sau72] or capacity and denoted by d) of a concept space
(X,C) is the largest cardinality (possibly infinite) of a set S ⊆ X that can be shattered by C. (It is
sufficient for only one set of this size to exist; not all sets of this size need to be shattered by C.) VC
dimension is an indicator of the complexity of a concept space. Related to VC dimension is the growth
function of a concept space (X,C), which is the maximum index of C over all samples S ⊆ X of size n:
mC(n) := maxS⊆X:|S|=n ∆C(S).
The VC dimension, then, is the largest value of n for which the growth function equals 2n. Knowing
the VC dimension of a concept space is sufficient to determine an upper bound on the growth function:








Lemma 2.3 (Sauer’s Lemma [Sau72]). Let (X,C) be a concept space having finite VC dimension d.















is upper-bounded by nd for d ≥ 2.
2.3 Sufficient Conditions for ε-Nets and ε-Samples
In their groundbreaking paper, Vapnik and Chervonenkis established a lower bound [VC71, Thm. 2]
on the probability that a sample S is an ε-sample, i.e., that the relative frequencies of events in C are
all within ε of their true probabilities.
Theorem 2.4 (Sufficient conditions for ε-sample [VC71]). Let (X,C) be a concept space with growth
function mC(n) and VC dimension d. Let D be a probability distribution on X and let S be a set of size
n drawn from X according to D. Then, for any ε > 0, the probability that S is an ε-sample is at least
1− 4 ·mC(2n) · e−ε















such that a sample S of size at least n is an ε-sample with probability at least 1− δ.
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an ε-sample with probability at least 1− δ.
Inspired by Vapnik and Chervonenkis’s work on ε-samples, Haussler and Welzel introduced ε-nets
and derived a lower bound in the case where the distribution over X is uniform [HW86, Thm. 3.7].
Later work extended this bound to arbitrary distributions:
Theorem 2.5 (Sufficient conditions for ε-net [MU17]). Let (X,C) be a concept space with growth func-
tion mC(n) and VC dimension d. Let D be a probability distribution on X and let S be a set of size
n drawn from X according to D. Then, for any ε > 0, the probability that S is an ε-net is at least















such that a sample of at least this size is an ε-net with probability at least 1− δ. Specifically, a random






δ} is an ε-net with probability at least 1− δ.
Ehrenfeucht et al. prove a lower bound [EHKV89, Cor. 5] on the number of samples needed to
obtain an ε-net with probability at least 1− δ. Since every ε-sample is an ε-net, this lower bound also
applies to ε-samples.
Theorem 2.6 (Necessary conditions for ε-net [EHKV89, MU17]). Let (X,C) be a concept space of VC
dimension d. Let D be a probability distribution on X and let S be sample drawn from X according to D.











Introduced by Valiant [Val84], PAC learning is concerned with algorithms that learn from labelled
examples. (We restrict our attention to realizable and consistent PAC learning; for a more general
treatment see [KVV94].) Using the terminology above, a learner L is an algorithm which takes as
input a transcript {(si, C(si))}mi=1 of elements from X (where each si←$ π for some distribution π on
X) along with their labels according to the unknown concept C. A learner outputs a hypothesis H ∈ C
representing its guess for C.
The learner L is a PAC learner for C if for any C ∈ C, distribution π on X, and 0 < ε, δ < 1/2,
for any sample (or transcript) of size m in O(poly(1ε ,
1
δ )) drawn according to π, the generalization error
Prπ [ {x ∈ X |H(x) 6= C(x)} ] is less than ε with probability at least 1 − δ. In words, the generaliza-
tion error is the probability under π that an element is labelled differently by H and C. A central
result [BEHW86] in learning theory states that if C has finite VC dimension, then there exists a (not
necessarily efficient) PAC learner for C. In particular, the following holds [MU17].
Theorem 2.7. Let (X,C) be a concept space with finite VC dimension d. Then for any 0 < ε, δ < 1/2,
















That is, for any concept C ∈ C, with probability at least 1− δ, L achieves generalization error less than
ε using a sample of size m.
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3 PAC Learning and Database Reconstruction Attacks
In this section, we begin exploring the connection between learning theory and database reconstruction
attacks. Concretely, we demonstrate a connection between approximate database reconstruction and
“Probably Approximately Correct” (PAC) learning [Val84] in the setting where the attacker has access
pattern leakage from some known queries. For a brief introduction to PAC learning, see Section 2.4.
Reconstruction via PAC learning. The attack setting we consider here is one in which an attacker
has observed the access pattern leakage from a number of known queries drawn i.i.d. from a fixed
query distribution (which the adversary does not need to know). The assumption of known queries is
somewhat stronger than has been considered previously in this literature; however, some recent works
have argued that it is realistic [GSB+17, GMN+16] on the grounds that the adversary is able to make
some queries or has compromised an honest user.
A crucial question is the relationship between the number of known queries and the amount of
information the adversary can learn about the database itself, cf. Section 1. We will see that this
question is largely resolved via a simple reduction to PAC learning in the known query setting.
We can think of a database DB with R records having values in [N ] as being a vector of length R
with values in [N ]; the value of record j is DB[j]. We construct a concept space C = (Q,C) as follows.
The points in the ground set are the possible queries q ∈ Q. We write q(i) = 1 when value i ∈ [N ]
matches query q. We set Ci = {q ∈ Q | q(i) = 1}. We then define C = {Ci : i ∈ [N ]}. With this set-up,
we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Let Q be a class of queries and C = (Q,C) be the concept space constructed as above.
Let πq be any distribution over Q. Let d be the VC dimension of C, and assume d is finite. Then,
there is an adversary such that for any database DB, given as input m ∈ O(dε log
d
εδ ) queries sampled
from πq and their access pattern leakage on DB, the adversary outputs a database DB
′ such that
Prπq [ q(DB[j]) 6= q(DB′[j]) ] ≤ ε holds simultaneously for all j ∈ [R], with probability at least 1−Rδ.
This theorem requires some explanation. In the statement, we chose to use the generalization error
Prπq [ q(DB[j]) 6= q(DB′[j]) ] as the accuracy measure. This is intended to surface the core points
without adding unnecessary detail, but it may also make the result hard to interpret. Section 6 studies
in more detail how generalization error relates to traditional notions of attack accuracy.
The proof proceeds via a natural reduction to PAC learning. The adversary gets as input m known
queries along with their access pattern leakage (i.e. which records match the query) for each of the R
records in the database. The core observation is that the access pattern is a binary classification of
each database element; further, each database value is a concept in C. This means that the task of
reconstructing each database element can be seen as R PAC learning experiments for the concept space
C defined above. The adversary simply runs the PAC learner from Theorem 2.7 R times, invoking it
once for each record j. For each invocation, the adversary gives the learner as input the m queries and
their access patterns (i.e. the 0/1 labellings) for record j. Each time the learner is run, it outputs a
hypothesis Hind ∈ C corresponding to an element of [N ]. The adversary’s complete output is then of the
form [H1, H2, . . . ,HR], which we denote by DB
′. Each independent invocation of the learner outputs a
hypothesis Hj such that Prπq [ q(Hj) 6= q(DB[j]) ] > ε with probability at most δ, and a union bound
over the R elements completes the proof.
Remark. Here, we obtain a probability bound that depends on R. While this may look discouraging,
the sample complexity of PAC learning is only logarithmic in δ, so the resulting loss in tightness is small.
Further, in Appendix A, we show that the dependency on R can be removed. The proof in Appendix A
does not use a generic reduction to PAC learning; instead it uses a fixed learner and applies the ε-net
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theorem. The approach we chose in this section is simpler and directly highlights the connection with
PAC learning.
Extensions. The above result can be extended in several ways. First, a symmetric and nearly identical
result can be proven about query reconstruction attacks in the presence of known records. Such a result
would proceed as above except flipping the role of the queries and values in the concept space. An
interesting extension of the above result (and its twin for known database elements) is a setting where
the adversary has both known and unknown queries (or database elements). One question which our
PAC learning approach can address is how much information the adversary learns about the unknown
information elements by PAC learning with its known information.
Some authors have argued recently that the even stronger setting of chosen query attacks is a
realistic threat model for encrypted databases. With chosen queries, the corresponding learning setting
is not PAC learning, but active learning [DL]. Active learning is similar to PAC learning except the
learner can adaptively query an oracle which labels points in X according to the unknown concept.
Interestingly, both the folklore binary-search attack on order-revealing encryption and the Zhang et
al. [ZKP16] document-injection attack can be viewed as active learning algorithms.
We note that lower bounds on the sample complexity of PAC learning can be used to prove that
certain kinds of security guarantees hold even in the presence of some known or chosen queries (or
database elements). In Section 6 we state and prove one such result which does not assume any records
or queries are known to the adversary.
Closing remark. In the encrypted database literature, it has become apparent that known- and
chosen-query attacks are damaging. However, the quantitative question (“How severe a risk is a known-
or chosen-plaintext attack?”) has not been fully explored. We posit that extending the above result
using techniques from learning theory will fully resolve this question. Rather than developing this theme
further here, we leave it to future work and focus the remainder of this work on more challenging attack
settings.
4 Sacrificial Approximate Database Reconstruction
In this section, we turn to range queries, and introduce sacrificial ε-approximate database reconstruc-
tion (sacrificial ε-ADR). Sacrificial ε-ADR asks to successfully recover the value of every record in the
database within εN , for some target precision ε, save for records whose value lies within εN of 1 or
N . The term ε-approximate means that reconstruction is within an error of εN , as in [LMP18]. The
term sacrificial means the attack “sacrifices” records whose value lies within εN of the endpoints. We
explain the need for this and provide a full definition in Section 4.1. The rest of the section presents
two results.
In Section 4.2, we extend KKNO’s database reconstruction attack [KKNO16] to sacrificial ε-ADR.
A direct application of the ε-sample theorem from learning theory shows the dependency on N vanishes:
the required number of queries becomes O(ε−4 log ε−1), making the attack scale-free.
In Section 4.3, we introduce a new algorithm, ApproxValue, for sacrificial ε-ADR with a mild
additional hypothesis h1: the database contains at least one record whose value lies in [0.2N, 0.3N ] ∪
[0.7N, 0.8N ]. Under this hypothesis, ApproxValue achieves sacrificial ε-ADR within onlyO(ε−2 log ε−1)
queries. The analysis also uses the ε-sample theorem, but is somewhat more involved. This attack shows
the pathological nature of KKNO’s lower bounds on query complexity for FDR. An experimental valida-
tion in Section 4.4 supports the analysis, and shows that the constants in the O notation are empirically
very small.
As noted in the introduction, the previous two results also imply full database reconstruction within
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O(N4 logN) queries in general, and O(N2 logN) when h1 is satisfied. In Appendix E, we show that
both attacks are optimal in data within a logarithmic factor—any adversary achieving sacrificial ε-ADR
for all databases (resp. databases satisfying h1) must require Ω(ε
−4) (resp. Ω(ε−2)) queries.
4.1 Definition of Sacrificial ε-ADR
We now formally define sacrificial ε-approximate database reconstruction (sacrificial ε-ADR). Let ε > 0
be the desired precision. Let est-val(r) denote the value predicted by the algorithm for record r.
Sacrificial ε-ADR is said to succeed iff one of the following two events occur:
1. For every record r such that εN ≤ val(r) ≤ N + 1− εN , |est-val(r)− val(r)| < εN .
2. For every record r such that εN ≤ val(r) ≤ N + 1− εN , |est-val(r)− (N + 1− val(r))| < εN .
The fact that reconstruction is only possible up to reflection is inherent to this setting, as seen in
[KKNO16, LMP18]. It is required that for all values (except those within εN of the extrema), either
the estimated value is within εN of the correct value, or its reflection. But whichever case it is holds
simultaneously for all values. In other words, only one bit of information is missing globally regarding
the reflection symmetry. Note that setting ε = 1/N yields full database reconstruction (FDR), i.e. exact
value reconstruction for all records.
Finally, we come to explaining why our attack needs to be sacrificial. Sacrificing values that are
close to 1 and N is inherent to a scale-free attack under a uniform query assumption. Intuitively, these
values are harder to recover because fewer range queries touch them. The probability of hitting records
with values 1 and N with a uniform range query is 2/(N + 1) = O(1/N). This remains true for any
record whose value is within O(1) of 1 or N : hitting one of these records requires Ω(N) queries. If they
are not hit, then it is impossible for the algorithm to differentiate them or determine which records are
on the same side of N/2—reflection symmetry cannot be determined globally for those values. Note
that if the set of all records is known our algorithms can infer that these records have values close to
either 1 or N because they were not hit by a query.
If a query on some range [1, x] for some x ∈ [εN,N + 1 − εN ] is ever issued, then the attacker is
trivially able to break the reflection symmetry between the values within εN of 1 and N (since the
query will hit records with values near one of the endpoints, but not the other). The problem is that
with uniform queries, the probability of such a query is O(1/N), so requiring such a query to occur
is not scale-free. In practice, though, a query of that form seems likely, since endpoints are generally
“interesting” to query. For that reason, we view the sacrificial aspect of the attack as more of an artefact
of the analysis than a practical issue. Nevertheless, it must be addressed in a formal treatment of the
attack.
4.2 Generalizing the KKNO Attack
We now present our generalization of the KKNO attack to sacrificial ε-ADR. Our algorithm proceeds
in two steps. The first step is to (approximately) recover the value of each record up to reflection





val(r), N + 1− val(r)
)
. The second step of the algorithm is to determine which values are on the
same side of N/2 so that, in the end, the value of records is recovered up to reflection globally, as
discussed above.
We focus here on the first step of the attack because it suffices to highlight the main ideas. For
the second step and its analysis, we refer the reader to Appendix B. Note that the first step does not
sacrifice any values: this is necessary only to break the reflection symmetry.
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The idea underpinning the attack is natural: a given query distribution (in this case, the uniform
distribution) induces a distribution on the probability that each value is hit by a range query. By
measuring that probability empirically, the value of a record can be inferred. More precisely, for a
value k ∈ [1, N ], let Ak denote the set of ranges in [1, N ] that contain k. Observe that there are
|[1, k]× [k,N ]| = k(N + 1− k) such ranges.
We also assimilate Ak with the event that a uniform range falls within Ak, i.e. contains the value






k(N + 1− k). (1)
We note that x 7→ p(x) is quadratic and reaches its maximum at x = (N + 1)/2. It is symmetric about
that value, as implied by the reflection symmetry of the setting.
The algorithm simply measures p(x) empirically for each record by counting how many times that
record is hit by a query, and dividing by the number of queries. It then infers the symmetric value of the
record by choosing k such that p(k) is as close as possible to the empirical measurement. Pseudo-code
is provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Estimating symval.
Input: {Mi}1≤i≤Q.
Output: est-symval : R → {1, . . . , N/2}.
1: for all r ∈ R do
2: c← |{i : r ∈Mi}| /Q
3: est-symval(r)← arg mink∈{1,...,N/2} |p(k)− c|
4: end for
5: return est-symval
We now turn to the analysis of the algorithm: how many queries are required to achieve sacrificial
ε-ADR? Because the function p used to infer record values is quadratic and flat around (N + 1)/2,
getting an error of ε on the input of p, i.e., on record values, requires an error bounded by O(ε2) on
the output of p. That is, for ε-ADR to succeed, the difference between the empirical estimate c/Q for
a record r and its expectation p(val(r)) should be O(ε2). See Appendix B for the formal proof.
Hence what we want is that the empirical probability of each event Ak should be within O(ε2) of its
expected value, for all values k. If we were to naively apply a union bound, since there are N distinct
values k, we would get a dependency on N . Instead, a direct application of VC theory shows that
O(ε−4 log ε−1) queries suffice, with no dependency on N . To see this, the idea is to define the ground
set X as the set of all ranges in [1, N ], and the concept set C as the Ak’s, i.e., each Ak is a concept.
Then what we want is exactly a Ω(ε2)-sample on that concept class.
Proposition 4.1. The growth function of (X,C) is 2n, and its VC dimension is 2.
The proof of Proposition 4.1 is given in Appendix B. As a direct consequence, we can apply the




ε−4 log ε−1 + ε−4 log δ−1
)
queries suffice for Algorithm 1 to recover the symmetric value of all records within εN , except with
probability at most δ. Thus for any fixed probability of success η = 1 − δ < 1, Algorithm 1 succeeds
within O(ε−4 log ε−1) queries.
For the full attack, see Appendix B. The rest of the attack uses similar ideas, and the first step is
representative of the techniques involved. The final query complexity remains O(ε−4 log ε−1).
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4.3 The ApproxValue Attack
Next we introduce the ApproxValue algorithm, which achieves sacrificial ε-ADR within O(ε−2 log ε−1)
queries, saving roughly a square root factor over the generalization of KKNO’s algorithm presented
above. In particular, setting ε = 1/N yields full database reconstruction within O(N2 logN) queries,
significantly improving on KKNO’s original O(N4 logN) bound. This comes at the cost of the attack
requiring a mild hypothesis about the database. The hypothesis h1 asks that there exist at least
one record in the database with a value in [0.2N, 0.3N ] ∪ [0.7N, 0.8N ]. The constants here are for
concreteness; others would work as well. The record does not need to be known to the adversary, it
suffices that it exist in the database.
We note that an hypothesis such as h1 is necessary to achieve a query complexity of O(ε−2 log ε−1):
in Appendix E, we prove that any algorithm achieving sacrificial ε-ADR in full generality requires Ω(ε−4)
queries. With h1 we prove a similar lower bound of Ω(ε
−2), so ApproxValue is optimal in data within
a logarithmic factor. We believe that O(ε−2) (resp. N2) better captures the actual cost of ε-ADR (resp.
full reconstruction) on a real database, assuming a uniform query distribution: the O(ε−4) cost of the
original attack was because the bound had to account for pathological cases where h1 is not satisfied.
Such databases have all records concentrated around 1, N/2 and N . None of the real datasets used in
our experiments had this property.
Next we explain how we gain a square factor over the previous attack, which required O(ε−4 log ε−1)
queries. Above we saw that the main ε4 term comes as a result of ε being squared twice: first, to move
from the estimate c/Q of p(val(r)) to the symmetric value of the record, and second by applying the
ε-sample theorem to uniformly approximate p across all values.
The second squaring is inherent: even if we wanted to approximate p on a single value, we would
still need to approximate p within ε, which requires Ω(ε2) queries. (See Lemma E.1 in Appendix E.) In
contrast, the first squaring ultimately comes from the fact that p is quadratic. We can avoid it if we
use a linear function to approximate record values: this is exactly what happens in the ApproxValue
algorithm.
Pseudo-code of the ApproxValue algorithm is provided in Algorithm 2. The first step is to identify
a record whose (symmetric) value is as close as possible to N/4. Hypothesis h1 implies a suitable record
exists. We call the resulting record the anchor record. Because its value is close enough to N/4,
identifying such a record does not incur the quadratic cost of the function p as in the previous section,
because that cost only occurs near the extremum of the function at (N + 1)/2. We then determine the
value of every other record up to symmetry around the anchor by measuring the empirical probability
that a query hits both the target record and the anchor record. Let vA denote the value of the anchor









k(N + 1− vA) if k ≤ vA
vA(N + 1− k) if k > vA.
The second step of the ApproxValue algorithm is to use the function x 7→ d(vA, x) exactly as
we used x 7→ p(x) in the previous section to estimate a record’s value. The crucial point is that while
x 7→ p(x) was quadratic, x 7→ d(vA, x) is piecewise linear (with a single bend at vA). This avoids the
first squaring discussed earlier.
The third and final step of ApproxValue is to use p once again to break the symmetry around vA
inherent to the mapping x 7→ d(vA, x) used in the previous step. However, this limited use of p does
not incur a new square factor. In the end, we obtain the following result.
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Algorithm 2 Approximate database reconstruction algorithm.
ApproxValue(Q):
Input: Set of queries Q.
Output: Function est-val approximating val.
1: Q← |Q|
2: for each record r do
3: c(r)← |{q ∈ Q : r ∈ q}|
4: ṽ(r)← arg mink |c(r)/Q− p(k)|
5: end for
6: rA ← arg minr |ṽ(r)−N/4| . Anchor record
7: ṽA ← ṽ(rA) . Est. anchor value
8: for each record r do
9: c′(r)← |{q ∈ Q : rA, r ∈ q}|
10: w̃L ← arg mink∈[1,ṽA] |d(ṽA, k)− c
′(r)/Q|
11: w̃R ← arg mink∈[ṽA,N ] |d(ṽA, k)− c
′(r)/Q|





















queries, ApproxValue achieves sacrificial ε-ADR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
A formal proof is given in Appendix C. Given any constant probability of success η < 1, ApproxValue
achieves sacrificial ε-ADR within O(ε−2 log ε−1) queries.
4.4 Experimental Results
The ApproxValue attack achieves ε-ADR within O(ε−2 log ε−1) queries (for any given constant prob-
ability of success η < 1). We experimentally evaluate the tightness of this bound for a fixed number
of records, R, and various numbers of possible values, N , so that we generate both dense and sparse
databases. Record values are sampled uniformly at random, so hypothesis h1 was satisfied with high
probability. Our results are averaged over 500 databases, each with 500 randomly sampled queries.
For the attack to succeed, the difference |est-val(r)− val(r)| should be at most εN for records at least
εN away from the endpoints. The records whose values are near the endpoints may have been placed on
the wrong side of N/2 relative to the anchor record. The bottom group of lines in Figure 2 shows, after
every 10 queries, the maximum symmetric value of such misclassified records. As discussed in Section 4.1,
sacrificing reconstruction of some records is necessary. Nevertheless, we see that our practical results
are even better than Theorem 4.2 suggests: the upper bound on the maximum symmetric value of
a sacrificed record still holds when we take it with all constants set to 1 – in particular, taking the
VC dimension to be 1, not taking into account the success probability, and taking any multiplicative
constant hidden by the O() notation to be 1.
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R = 1000, compared to theoretical ε-sample bound
Figure 2: Maximum symmetric errors of all records and maximum symmetric values of records that
were sacrificed. Results averaged over 500 databases satisfying h1 for each value of N .
The primary reason this “no-constants” bound holds is because the bound in Theorem 4.2 inherits
the looseness of the ε-sample theorem (cf. Theorem 2.4): while VC theory is a good predictor of
asymptotic behavior, constants are notoriously loose. In particular, one point where loss of tightness
arises in the proof of the ε-sample theorem (e.g., as in [MU17, Lemma 14.17]) is when using the growth
function to upper bound the number of subsamples induced in the so-called double sample. Tightening
this bound is possible, for instance, with sample-based growth functions [STW99]. A benefit of running
experiments is that they allow us to estimate the constant in practice: in our experiments, simply
setting all constants to 1 provided a reasonable estimation of the attack’s success.
In addition to limiting the sacrificed values’ distance from the endpoints, a successful ε-ADR at-
tack must correctly estimate the other records’ values within εN , up to global reflection. The upper
group of lines in Figure 2 is the maximum error of the symmetric values, i.e., the maximum difference
|min{est-val(r), N + 1− est-val(r)} − symval(r)| over all records r, as a fraction of N . The reason we
plot the symmetric error rather than the absolute error is that it allows us to present results for all
records at once—even sacrificed records. It also gives an upper bound on the errors |est-val(r)− val(r)|
for records that were not sacrificed. Overall, we see that experimental results behave in the manner
predicted by the theory, including scale-freeness, and that the O() upper bound derived by the theory
holds in practice, even when setting the hidden multiplicative constant to just 1.
5 Approximate Order Reconstruction
Attack algorithms in the previous section strongly relied on the query distribution being known to the
adversary, and on queries being drawn independently and uniformly at random. Of course, real-world
queries are hardly independent, let alone i.i.d. uniform. In this section, we propose and analyze an
algorithm that forgoes any such assumption.
16
As a starting point, observe that, absent any kind of frequency information, access pattern leakage
on range query still reveals something about the order of records. To see this, consider the following
simple example. Say we have three records a, b, c, and observe the leakage of two queries: the first
matches records a, b, and the second matches records b, c. Then it is easy to convince oneself that the
only possible orders of records are abc, and its reflection cba. For any other order, ab or bc would not
be adjacent. Thus, we see that even raw access pattern leakage, by itself, reveals information about the
order of records.
This gives rise to two questions: (1) how to extract order information from access pattern leakage;
and (2) how to quantify the speed at which we learn order information. For the first point, most of
the heavy lifting will be done by PQ-trees, a data structured tailored to solving precisely this problem,
presented in Section 5.2. To tackle the second point, in Section 5.1, we introduce the notion of sacrificial
ε-approximate order reconstruction (sacrificial ε-AOR). In Section 5.3, we present our ApproxOrder
algorithm, which shows how PQ-trees can be used to target sacrificial ε-AOR; and analyze its query
complexity using VC theory. In Section 5.4, we experimentally evaluate the bounds. In Section 5.5
we show how the attack can be extended to recover approximate record values, rather than just their
order, and present experimental results.
Remark. Taking a step back, we note that what range query leakage reveals by itself is the order
of records. For sparse databases, numerical information on values can be recovered when some form
of additional frequency information is available to the adversary: such information can be the query
distribution (as in Section 4), or an approximation of the database distribution (as in Section 5.5).
5.1 Definition of Sacrificial ε-AOR
Sacrificial ε-approximate order reconstruction (sacrificial ε-AOR) asks to recover the order of records,
except for records that are within εN of each other (“approximate” recovery), and for records within
εN of the endpoints 1 and N (“sacrificed” records).
We first introduce some notation: if A is a set of records, then the diameter of A is the largest
difference between the values of any two records in A, i.e.: diam(A)
def
= max{val(b)− val(a) : a, b ∈ A}.
We let < denote the order on records induced by their values, i.e. r < s iff val(r) < val(s). For two sets
of records A and B, we write A < B to denote ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, a < b.
An algorithm is said to achieve sacrificial ε-AOR iff it outputs disjoint subsets of records A1, . . . , Ak
such that:
1. ∀i, diam(Ai) < εN .
2. A1 < · · · < Ak holds up to reflection.
3. For all r 6∈
⋃
Ai, val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ].
The definition implies that the algorithm reveals the order of the values of any two records, as soon
as they are at least εN apart; except possibly for records whose value is within εN of 1 or N . If we set
ε = 1/N , sacrificial ε-AOR is equivalent to recovering the exact order of all records.
5.2 PQ-Trees
Our attack makes use of PQ-trees [BL76], a special structure that makes it possible to compactly
represent the set of all orders on records compatible with a given access pattern leakage.
PQ-trees were introduced in [BL76], and are typically used as tools to solve other algorithmic
problems (such as planarity testing for graphs). Given a ground set X with an unknown order, together
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with a set I containing intervals of X for that order, a PQ-tree succinctly represents (i.e. in size linear
in |X|) the set of all orderings of X that are compatible with I. Moreover a PQ-tree can be updated
on the fly: given a PQ-tree and a new interval I not previously contained in I, the PQ-tree can be
updated in linear time to only contain those orders that are compatible with I ∪ {I}. (Details of the
update procedure are not relevant to our work.)
The structure of a PQ-tree is simple: the leaves of the tree are labelled by the ground set X, each
element of X appearing in exactly one leaf. Internal nodes of the tree consist in two types of nodes:
P-nodes and Q-nodes. Both types of nodes can have any number of children leaf or non-leaf nodes.
P-nodes denote that the children of the node can be ordered in any way. For example, if X = {a, b, c},
then the tree P (a, b, c) represents the set of all permutations of X. Q-nodes denote that the children
of the node can only be ordered either as they appear in the tree, or as the reverse order (a.k.a. its
reflection). For example, if X = {a, b, c}, then the tree Q(a, b, c) represents the orders abc and cba.
Nodes combine in the natural way: for example, the tree Q(a, b, P (c, d)) represents the possible orders
abcd, abdc, cdba, dcba.
Initially, when no information whatsoever is known about the order, the PQ-tree consists in a single
P-node, with all elements of the ground set as leaves. Conversely, once the order is fully determined,
the tree consists in a single Q-node, whose leaves are either in the correct order or its reflection. This
corresponds to the usual reflection symmetry, which cannot be broken by learning intervals (as replacing
the order on X by its reflection leaves the set of intervals invariant).
In our setting, it is possible that the ground set X, which corresponds to the set of all record IDs, is
not known in advance. However PQ-trees can be easily extended to handle that case: to do so, we start
with a tree formed of a P-node with a single leaf labelled by a special element ?. Whenever the tree is
updated with a new set I, if I contains new elements not already among the leaves of the current tree,
these new elements are first added as siblings of ?. The tree is then updated with I as normal.
5.3 The ApproxOrder Attack
We now present the ApproxOrder algorithm, which targets sacrificial ε-AOR. Pseudo-code is given
in Algorithm 3. The pseudo-code uses the following notation: if S is a node of a PQ-tree T , then the
leaves of S are defined as the leaves of the subtree rooted at S, and denoted leaf(S); and root(T ) denotes
the root of T .
The idea is to first build the PQ-tree induced by the query access pattern leakage. The algorithm
then locates the deepest node T in the tree such that the leaves below T contain a strict majority of all
records. The algorithm returns as its output the set Ai of leaves below each child Ci of T , in the order
of the children of T . Thus, the order between two records is learned by the adversary iff they appear
below distinct children of T , and the order between the two records matches the order of the children
of T below which they appear.
Analytically, our main result is as follows. The theorem assumes hypotheses h2 and h3, which will
be presented below, and a uniform query distribution.
















queries, ApproxOrder achieves sacrificial ε-AOR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Appendix D. For any fixed constant probability of success,
the algorithm succeeds using only O(ε−1 log ε−1) queries. As a direct corollary (setting ε = 1/N), the
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Algorithm 3 The ApproxOrder Attack for sacrificial ε-AOR.
ApproxOrder(Q):
Input: Set of queries Q.
Output: Disjoint subsets of records A1, . . . , Ak.
1: T ← PQ-tree built from Q.
2: T ← FindNodeT(T , root(T ))
3: C1, . . . , Ck ← children of T (in order)
4: return leaf(C1), . . . , leaf(Ck)
FindNodeT(T , S):
Input: PQ-tree T and node S of T .
Output: Deepest node S′ ≤ S with > R/2 leaves.
1: R← |leaf(root(T ))|
2: for each child C of S do
3: if |leaf(C)| > R/2 then




expected number of queries before the PQ-tree collapses into a single Q-node, thus completely revealing
the order up to reflection, is O(N logN).
The overall idea is that after that number of queries, with high probability there exist certain queries
whose endpoints partition [1, N ] into sufficiently small buckets while revealing the order between these
buckets. By properties of PQ-trees, this situation implies the existence of a node within the PQ-tree
that essentially directly reveals ε-approximate order (and that node can be easily located as the deepest
node covering a majority of records). Moreover, the existence of the aforementioned queries inducing
the partition is implied by an ε-net, so that ultimately the query complexity required for those queries
to exist is directly derived from the ε-net theorem of VC theory.
The result does require some assumptions about the existence of records having certain values in the
database, namely hypotheses h2 and h3. Hypothesis h2 requires that there exist two records with values
a and b such that a, b ∈ [N/4, 3N/4], and b− a ≥ N/3 (what really matters for the proof to go through
is that a, b should be Ω(N) away from 1, N and each other); and additionally that there exist at least
three records with values within [εN,N+1−εN ] that are more than εN away from each other (note that
a and b can be two of these values). Hypothesis h3 requires that a strict majority of all records have a
value within [εN,N + 1− εN ], and that no range of length εN contains the values of a (strict) majority
of all records. On the face of it, h2 and h3 seem like they are restrictive in that they make several
requirements on the database. But those requirements are quite mild. Both hypotheses essentially
ask that the database should not be too concentrated over a few values. We have not encountered a
real-world dataset that failed to satisfy those requirements. Further, only h2 is actually required for
the T node to exist and leak sacrificial ε-approximate order as claimed. The only point of hypothesis
h3, which is more demanding, is to ensure that that node is the deepest node covering a majority of
records, so that it can be easily located. But that is a theoretical concern: in our experiments, the
desired T node was usually in the first two levels of the tree. Thus, the practically relevant hypothesis
is h2, which only requires that the database should not be entirely concentrated near the endpoints.
In Appendix E.2, we prove that the query complexity of our algorithm is optimal within a constant
factor. More precisely, any (unbounded) adversary achieving sacrificial ε-AOR for all databases must
require Ω(ε−1 log ε−1) queries.
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R = 1000, compared to theoretical ε-net bound
Figure 3: Maximum symmetric values of records not in buckets and maximum bucket diameters.
Results averaged over 500 databases for each value of N .
5.4 Experimental Results
Assuming uniform queries, the ApproxOrder attack succeeds within O(ε−1 log ε−1) queries (for any
given constant probability of success η < 1). We experimentally evaluate the tightness of this bound for
a fixed number of records R, and various numbers of possible values, N , so that we generate both dense
and sparse databases. Record values are sampled uniformly at random, so hypotheses h2 and h3 were
satisfied with high probability. Our results are averaged over 500 databases, each with 500 randomly
sampled queries. We measured the results after every 10 queries, and therefore sometimes needed a
heuristic to identify a likely candidate for the Q node when the number of queries is very small. When
the root node was not a Q node, our experiments chose the first child Q node that contained at least a
third of the records. As our results indicate, this node usually contained an overwhelming majority of
the records.
The bottom group of lines in Figure 3 shows the maximum symmetric value (as a fraction ofN) of any
record that was not in one of the Q node’s children buckets. When the ApproxOrder attack succeeds,
the only records that are not necessarily in buckets are those with values in [1, εN [ or ]N + 1− εN,N ].
If all records have been placed into buckets below the Q node, the maximum excluded symmetric value
is set to 0. These results show that the theoretical upper bound holds, even when taking it with all
constants set to 1, like in Section 4.4. The attack also behaves in the predicted scale-free way: changing
N has little effect on empirical results.
The upper group of lines in Figure 3 shows the maximum diameter (as a fraction of N) of the Q
node’s child buckets. We compare this to the expected maximum diameter dictated by the ε-net bound,
and see that convergence happens as quickly as predicted by the bound taken with all constants set to
1, as in the previous case. Again, results are scale-free.
Another way of interpreting these results is to ask, after a certain number of queries, for what ε have
we achieved sacrificial ε-approximate order reconstruction? Our results indicate that the bottleneck is
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the maximum bucket diameter, not the sacrificed values, so the upper group of lines in Figure 3 could
be interpreted in this way.
Although our theoretical analysis for the ApproxOrder attack assumes a uniform query distri-
bution, this assumption was only for the analysis and the attacker does not need to know the query
distribution to carry out the attack. We consider now another more realistic distribution on queries,
namely fixed-width range queries. Such queries are widespread in practice: for example, the industry-
standard TPC-H contains six explicit fixed-width range queries. For a given number of possible values
N and width W ≤ N , there are N + 1 −W such ranges: [1,W ], [2,W + 1], . . . , [N + 1 −W,N ]. We
experimentally evaluate how well the ApproxOrder attack performs for a dataset of R = 1000 records,
N = 10000 possible values, and range queries of different widths. The results are in Figure 4. Unlike
the case of uniform range queries, the limiting factor here in attaining ε-AOR is initially the too-high
symmetric values of the sacrificed records. For small range widths (relative to the domain size, N),
these results are to be expected: when only a few queries have been observed, the total number of
possible values that have matched any query so far is limited, and thus the maximum symmetric value
of a record that is not in a bucket may be high. After this initial period, the attack’s performance
follows the results of the uniform range query case and reflects the behaviour of ε−1 log ε−1 .
5.5 From AOR to ADR
We now show how our approximate ordering attack can be combined with a model of the database
distribution π (commonly called an auxiliary distribution) to mount powerful ε-ADR attacks. That
is, we leverage our approximate ordering attack above to achieve approximate database recovery. Our
attack is somewhat reminiscent of the LMP auxiliary distribution attack, with two major differences:
(1) it does not require the additional rank leakage used by LMP, and (2) we can study its performance
analytically.
We implemented the resulting ε-ADR attack and conducted experiments with several datasets rep-
resentative of practical use cases of encrypted databases. As in the analysis of approximate order
reconstruction, we will assume here that the query distribution is uniform only to make the exposition
simpler—no part of our attack requires queries to be uniformly distributed. Our attack takes as input
the output of any algorithm achieving ε-AOR. It also takes a model of the database distribution π
(which needs only to approximate the true database distribution), the query distribution πq, and the
domain size N . It outputs an estimate for the underlying value of every record in the database. The
pseudocode for the attack is given in Algorithm 4.
Attack intuition. Briefly, the attack uses the observation that, for every disjoint subset of records Ai
(i ∈ [1, . . . , k]) given by ε-AOR, some information about the ranks of the records (i.e. their positions in
a sorted list of all records) in the subset is revealed. Because each sacrificed record could be before A1
or after Ak the exact ranks are unknown, but lower and upper bounds can be computed.
There are three main questions to answer in building an attack from this observation. (1) How
should the attack orient the Ai? (2) How many sacrificed records should go before A1? (3) How should
record values be estimated?
We now describe our attack and how it resolves these three questions. The first step, record
rank estimation orients the Ai (question 1), estimates the number of sacrificed records less than A1
(question 2), and produces an estimate of the range of ranks for each group. The second step, partition
estimation, uses order statistics to estimate a range of values (i.e. a partition of [N ]) for each range of
ranks obtained in the previous step. The third step, database estimation, estimates a value for the
records in each group given the estimated partition (question 3).
Record rank estimation. To recap, record rank estimation must (1) orient the Ais, (2) guess the
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Maximum sacrificed values for ApproxOrder, N = 10000,
R = 1000 records, fixed-width range queries











































Maximum bucket diameters for ApproxOrder, N = 10000,
R = 0 records, fixed-width range queries
Figure 4: (Top) Maximum symmetric values of records not in buckets. (Bottom) Maximum bucket
diameters. Results for fixed-width queries averaged over 500 databases for each value of range query
width.
number of sacrificed records less than A1, the first sorted group, and (3) estimate a range of ranks for
each Ai. Our attack uses a heuristic for orienting the Ai (this is function OrientSubsets in Algorithm 4):
first, measure the proportion of records above and below the middle group. Call these quantities p̂a
and p̂b, respectively. Then, compute the probability of a database value falling above (pa) and below
(pb) the value dN/2e. If p̂a > p̂b and pa > pb, keep that orientation, else choose the other one. Though
quite naive, below we will see this heuristic generally works well for real data distributions.
To guess the number of sacrificed records below the first sorted group (EstimateRank in Algorithm 4),
we use a more principled approach. Observe that the sacrificed records are exactly those with values
either lower than the value of the smallest left query endpoint (call this value `min) or higher than the
value of the largest right endpoint (call this rmax). Let Eij = (`min = i) ∩ (rmax = j) be the event that
`min is i and rmax is j. Let the number of sacrificed records be S and r0 be a random variable denoting
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the smallest rank for a record in A1. The RV r0 takes values in [0, . . . ,S ]. Conditioned on Eij , the
distribution of the number of sacrificed records to the left of i and right of j is binomial with sample
size S and probability of success pij =
Pr[ 1,...,i ]
Pr[ 1,...,i ]+Pr[ j,...,N ] where Pr [ x, . . . , y ] =
∑y
k=x π(k) and π is the
auxiliary distribution. Thus, for any r ∈ [0, . . . ,S ],
Pr [ r0 = r ] =
∑
i≤j∈[N ]








prij(1− pij)S−r Pr [ Eij ] .
If the number of queries is Q and the query distribution is uniform, we can compute Pr [ Eij ] via
inclusion-exclusion as follows. First, define f(x, y) = (x− y)(y − x+ 1)/N(N + 1). Then
Pr [ Eij ] = f(i, j)
Q − f(i, j − 1)Q
− f(i+ 1, j)Q + f(i+ 1, j − 1)Q .
This is the only part of the attack that uses the uniform distribution on queries. If we let π
[i,j]
q be
the probability that a query is contained in the range [i, j], with a non-uniform query distribution this
expression would be the same except with f(·, ·) replaced by π[·,·]q . The value r̂0 output by function
EstimateRank is then E [r0] =
∑S
r=0 rPr [ r0 = r ]. The expression Pr [ r0 = r ] has O(N2) terms, which
could make the attack scale poorly. Our implementation uses a heuristic to discard the terms for which
Pr [ Eij ] is very small, so computing E [r0] (a one-time operation) takes only about eighty minutes in
the worst case. Once we compute r̂0 we can find the lower and upper ranks for the Ai via addition; see
the line assigning ri in Algorithm 4.
Partition estimation. The output of the previous step is a lower and upper rank (call them rlb and
rub) for each Ai. From this we will recover a lower and upper value (eplb and epub) used by the final
step of the attack. To estimate values from ranks, we use order statistics. For a sample X1, . . . , Xs,





























(1− Pr [ 1, . . . , u ])j Pr [ 1, . . . , u ]s−j .




and do the same for epub. For a fixed rank and vary-














Database estimation. This is the simplest step—the previous step outputs a partition [1, ep1, . . . ,
ep|B|, N ] of [N ] where the records in group bi are between epi and epi+1, so we need only choose
a value in [epi, epi+1] to assign to the records in bi. Since we are concerned with minimizing the
absolute value of the difference between the true value and the guess, the natural choice is the median
of the database distribution π, conditioned on the range [epi, epi+1]. In Algorithm 4 this is written as
RangeMedian(π, epi, epi+1).
Experiment setup and data. We implemented Algorithm 4 in Python 2.7 and ran all our experi-
ments on an Ubuntu 16.04 desktop with an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU, clocked at 3.4GHz. We used an
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Algorithm 4 Recovering values from approximate order.
Input: T0, R,π,πq,N .
Output: [x1, x2, . . . , xR] (∀i,xi ∈ [N ]).
1: T ← OrientSubsets(T0)
2: B ← GetBuckets(T )
3: e← GetEnds(T )
4: r̂0 ← EstimateRank(e, πq, π)
5: for all bi ∈ B do
6: ri ← ri−1 + |bi|




8: medbi ← RangeMedian(π, epi−1, epi)
9: for all ind ∈ bi do




existing C++ implementation [Gro11] of the PQ-tree data structure and used SWIG [swi18] to call it
from Python.
We evaluate the attack on two datasets. The first is a database of registered pilots from the US
government Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [faa17]. It contains the ZIP code of residence for
over 61,000 pilots nationwide. ZIP codes are five-decimal-digit numbers. The most significant digits
reveal increasingly precise information about location—for example, the first three digits identify a
neighborhood in large cities. For more information see [Wik18]. For this experiment we use US Census
data about ZIP code population as an auxiliary model of the distribution. Though there are some
high-probability ZIP codes, the distribution is overall fairly uniform. Further, the FAA ZIP codes are
not well-modeled by the census data - their statistical distance is about 0.51.
The second is a database of California (CA) state public employee salaries from 2016. Salary data
is sensitive both for cultural reasons and because of the possibility of blackmail. The database contains
over 248,000 numbers between 0 and 762,000 US dollars. Most are salaries (i.e. at least 25,000 US
dollars), but a sizeable fraction are in the low hundreds of dollars. We did not remove the low dollar
amounts (as doing so could bias experiments in our favor) but we did truncate the few outliers over
500,000 US dollars. We used a database of around 120,000 New York (NY) state public employee salaries
from the same year as auxiliary data for this experiment. Both NY and CA salary datasets are roughly
Gaussian with means 73,000 and 67,000 respectively. Their statistical distance is about 0.19. Rather
than use the full CA salary database, in this experiment we subsampled random databases of 10,000
salaries and averaged the results to better understand how the attack performs on smaller databases.
Results and discussion. Our attacks will measure accuracy as percent error, that is, if the true value
of a record is u and the attack guesses v, (for u, v ∈ [N ] the error for that record is |u − v|/N . The
baseline guessing attack for this accuracy measure is predicting the median of the database distribution
for every record. Figure 5 shows the results of the ZIP code experiment averaged over 20 randomly-
generated transcripts and the salary experiments averaged over 10 randomly subsampled databases each
with 10 randomly-generated transcripts. We also show the baseline guessing accuracy. The variance
was low in all our experiments with 25 or more queries. With only ten queries, the variance for the
75th percentile error is quite high, which we intuitively expect—with so few queries many groups of




# Queries ZC SAL ZC SAL ZC SAL
10 4 2 7 4 11 7
25 2 1 4 2 7 4
50 1 1 3 2 6 3
100 1 1 2 2 5 3
BL 15 2 27 5 37 9
Figure 5: Accuracy of Algorithm 4 on FAA ZIP codes (‘ZC”, N = 9, 999) and CAL salaries (‘SAL”, N = 500, 000):
percentage of records recovered with error at most the listed percent of N . ‘BL” refers to baseline guessing. Error is
computed as |(actual)− (guessed)|/N).
codes have a fairly flat distribution our heuristic procedure OrientSubsets chose the wrong orientation
in about half of the experiments. The Ai were oriented correctly in all runs of the salary experiment.
Since there are only two ways to orient the Ai an incorrect guess is mostly inconsequential. We do not
include trials for which the PQ tree does not have a Q node at the first level. This happened only a
few times in all experiments for ZIP codes. For salary experiments with 10 queries about one-quarter
of the trials did not have a Q node at the first level. With 100 queries, about one-tenth of the trials did
not. (The attacker can tell when there is no Q node and choose to see more queries before running the
attack.)
The attack on ZIP codes performed extremely well. With only ten queries, we are able to guess the
first digit correctly for over half the records on average. Concretely, about half the database records
would have their state of residence partially revealed with only ten queries. With only one hundred
queries, we recover the first two digits (or a small window with only a few possibilities) for a majority
of the records in the database.
For the attack on salaries, the accuracy of the baseline guessing attack is artificially low because of
the skew of the distribution—the max value (which we use as the denominator to compute percent error)
is much larger than all but a tiny fraction of salaries. Thus, the baseline guessing attack having 5% error
translates to 25,000 USD, but most salaries are within 25,000 USD of the median, so baseline guessing
performs very poorly on most salaries. In contrast, our attack predicts a majority of the records in the
database to within 2% error (10,000 USD) with only fifty queries, and with only 100 queries predicts a
quarter with 1% error (5,000 USD).
6 Generalizing Approximate Reconstruction
We have seen how ε-nets and ε-samples can be used to build and analyze approximate reconstruction
attacks on range queries. In this section, we abstract a core technical idea from those attacks – that
records accessed the same way by most queries must be “close” – and show how it extends beyond
range queries. We explore this in three ways: (1) by using learning theory to define a natural and
general notion of distance relevant to access pattern attacks, (2) by showing how ε-nets are the right
technical tool for analyzing the meaning of this distance for particular query classes, and (3) by using
this distance notion to prove a general lower bound on the query complexity of any attack with access
pattern leakage. To the best of our knowledge, our general lower bound is the first such proof ever given
for this setting and illustrates a core finding of this work: the security impact of access pattern leakage
for any class of queries is related to its VC dimension.
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Distances induced by range queries. Let Ci be the set of range queries matching value i, and Cj ,
j. Then, the set of queries matching i XOR j (exactly one of i and j) is ∆(Ci, Cj), where ∆ is the
symmetric difference operator on sets, and the number of such queries is γ(i, j)
def
= |∆(Ci, Cj)|. We can
make three interesting observations about γ(i, j). First, it is related to the numerical distance metric
|i − j| (though, importantly, they are not identical). Second, γ(·, ·) is itself a metric on [N ]. Third,
distance in this metric is approximately revealed by the access pattern leakage of range queries: if every
query accesses either both or neither records i and j, then γ(i, j) is likely to be small. These three
properties were used extensively in our attacks on range queries, but they are not specific to range
queries: we can abstract them using ideas from learning theory.
Distance, generally. Consider any class of queries Q on [N ] and distribution π over those queries,
and consider the concept space (Q,C) with concepts C def= {Ci}i∈[N ], where each Ci
def
= {q ∈ Q | q(i) =
1}. Each query is a point in this concept space, and there is a set corresponding to each possible
value in [N ] containing the queries that match it. Now, define the symmetric difference concept space
(X,C)∆ def= (X,C∆), where C∆ def= {∆(Ci, Cj)}i,j∈[N ] and ∆(·, ·) is the symmetric difference of the input
sets. This new concept space contains, for each pair i, j, the queries which return exactly one of i, j.
By Lemma A.2, the VC dimension of C∆ is at most twice the VC dimension of C. Next, define the
function γπ(i, j)
def
= Prπ [ ∆(Ci, Cj) ]. As above for range queries, where implicitly π was the uniform
distribution, this defines a metric on [N ]. To see that the triangle inequality holds, observe that for
any i, j, and k, any query in ∆(Ci, Cj) is in ∆(Ci, Ck) or ∆(Ck, Cj). This allows us to generalize
the use of ε-nets in ApproxOrder to arbitrary query classes. If the adversary observes a set of
queries that is an ε-net for the symmetric difference concept space, then it must be the case that for
any subset S of records with identical access pattern, the underlying values V of those records satisfy
diamγ(V )
def
= maxi,j∈V γπ(i, j) ≤ ε.
Thus, if we simply group together records that have the same access pattern, then the existence of
an ε-net provides an upper bound on the distance (with respect to the measure γ) of records in the same
group. Essentially, access pattern leakage from any query class reveals a kind of approximate equality
between the underlying values of the records in the database. This approximate equality depends both
on the query class and the query distribution. For range queries, we used this approximate equality
to build the ApproxOrder attack and reveal a great deal of information with few queries. However,
closeness in the metric γ may not be practically interesting for all query classes and distributions: for
example, access pattern leakage from the “query class” which is sampled uniformly at random from
2[N ] is unlikely to reveal anything interesting. Nevertheless, for many query classes used in practice,
closeness in this distance metric can lead to serious privacy breaches. For example, for prefix queries,
two values being close in this metric implies they have a common prefix. We will show a simple attack
that allows an adversary to reveal which records in the database are approximately equal according to
the distance metric γπ.
Approximate equality attack. Consider a set of queries Q, possible record values [N ], and resulting
concept space (Q,C), whose VC dimension d we assume is finite and ≥ 2. Let πq be any distribution
over Q. The attack takes as input records {r1, r2, . . . , rR} along with a 0-1 matrix AP with R rows
and Q columns, where APij = 1 iff query j returns record i. The attack views each row of the matrix
as a number in [0, 2Q − 1] and outputs a partition by grouping all records with the same number.
Let gi = {ri1, . . . , rik} be any such group, and let V = {v1, . . . , vk} be the underlying values of these
records. An application of the ε-net theorem lets us immediately conclude that Prπq [ diamγ(V ) ≤ ε ] >
1− (2Q)d2−εQ/2, and this bound holds for all groups simultaneously.
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6.1 Prefix and Suffix Queries
Next, we show how to instantiate the approximate equality attack for a practically relevant query class.
For a set Σ≤` of all strings with length ≤ ` from some alphabet Σ, define a prefix query q to be a string
in the set ∪`j=1Σj . In text search, prefix queries are usually indicated by a trailing asterisk “*”. For any
element j ∈ Σ≤`, define the predicate q(j) to be 1 if either q = j or q is a prefix of j, and 0 otherwise.
As an example, take the database {cat, carbon}. A prefix query “c*” on these two values would return
both, but “carb*” would return only the second one.
Although prefix queries are technically a subset of range queries, there are three crucial differences
which obviate the use of previous attacks on range queries: prefix queries do not reveal order, they
cannot overlap without one query being contained in the other, and the number of queries matching
any fixed string is constant. (Replacing “prefix” with “suffix” in the discussion above gives an identical
query class that matches strings based on a suffix instead of a prefix. Our discussion and attacks easily
translate to suffix queries, so we dispense with a separate discussion for them.)
In the the symmetric difference concept space for prefix queries, the concepts ∆(Ci, Cj) for i, j ∈ Σ≤`
are the queries that are prefixes of exactly one of i or j. If i and j themselves have a common prefix,
though, some prefix queries will match both i and j. More precisely, if i and j have a length-k common
prefix, then |∆(Ci, Cj)| = (|i| − k) + (|j| − k). Informally, if the adversary notices that two records
are always accessed together or not at all, then it can infer that they share a long common prefix. We
will describe how to formalize this intuition with ε-nets. Further, if the adversary has a model of the
database distribution, it can use frequency analysis to learn the characters of each record, one at a time
(reminiscent of the climax of the science-fiction movie WarGames).
A WarGames attack on prefix search. Most modern text and web search systems support prefix
queries on unstructured data [es18], and they are ubiquitous in software-as-a-service (SaaS) products
like Salesforce, ServiceNow, and Dropbox [sal18, sno18, dro18]. A common [dro18, sal18] design pattern
for these systems is to send a prefix query for every character the user types in the search bar. Since
users may find their desired result without finishing their query, the distribution of queries is heavily
biased towards shorter prefixes.
Our attack in this setting is simple. First, the adversary runs the approximate equality attack
described above, obtaining a partition of the records in the database. Then, for each record, it takes
the union of all query results containing that record. Here is where we apply the generalized distance
notion discussed earlier: with an ε-net, we can ensure that each group in the partition contains records
with at least a length-one common prefix, and that the unions we form afterwards are exactly the sets of
records with the same first character. The first character of each record is then recovered via frequency
analysis, and the attack is iterated to learn the second character, then the third, etc.
Analyzing the attack. We model the queries as being sampled via a two-step process. First, a prefix
length `q is sampled from a Zipf distribution on [`]. (Recall that the standard Zipf distribution on `
elements has Pr [ i ] = (1/i)/H`, where H` =
∑`
m=1 1/m is the `th harmonic number.) Then, the query
is sampled as a uniformly random element of Σ`q . Call this distribution over queries πts.
We first consider, for two words i, j ∈ Σ≤`, how the length of i and j’s common prefix relates to










. Let `min be the length of the shortest string. If the
queries observed by the adversary are an ε-net for the symmetric difference concept space and for
ε = 1H`
∑`min
m=1 1/(m|Σ|m), then, for all i, j having no common prefix, we have the distance γπts(i, j) > ε
and a query accessing i and j differently must have occurred. The VC dimension of this concept space
is at most 4, so O(1ε log
1
εδ ) queries suffice for this attack to recover the first character of every record
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with probability at least 1− δ. This same analysis can be iterated for the rest of the characters.
Experiments. We implemented the attack using last name data from the Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP) database dump, posted online in 2016. It contains the personal information of over 600,000 law
enforcement officers in the United States. For auxiliary data, we used public US Census statistics [Bur16]
on last name frequencies. We also ran the attack on the FAA ZIP code dataset from the experiments
in Section 5.5, but it performed quite poorly, primarily due to the auxiliary data being a poor model of
the ZIP code distribution.
In 9 out of 10 trials with only 500 prefix queries sampled according to the distribution described
above, we were able to partition the records into groups with at least a one-character prefix in common.
The mean number of queries required to do this was 315. Once we obtain this partition, we recovered the
first character for over 70% of the last-name records. With the same number of trials for 40,000 queries,
we recovered the first and second characters of over 55% of the last-name records. With 3 million
queries, we recovered the first three characters for over 40% of last-name records, and we recovered
roughly 1,500 three-character last names exactly. The sample complexities given by the ε-net theorem
above are 1,491, 120,000, and 6 million for recovering 1, 2, and 3 characters—much higher than our
experiments indicated. As we saw above, applying these results can give loose bounds but the “true”
constants are usually small.
This attack on prefix queries can be improved. Our goal was not simply to construct an accurate
reconstruction attack for prefix queries, but to demonstrate the power of the learning-theoretic approach
in building and analyzing reconstruction attacks. We can generalize the prefix attack to obtain the
three basic steps for this approach: (1) define a concept space and a metric, (2) use an ε-net to
analyze the number of queries needed to learn approximate equality, then (3) perform an attack on the
information about values revealed by approximate equality. We note also that standard results [MU17]
on intersections and unions of concept classes can extend this approach to composite query classes (e.g.
a SQL query which intersects the result of a range query on one column and a prefix query on another).
6.2 A General Lower Bound on Attacks
The metric γ is defined for any query class, and in many cases this leads to privacy implications: for
range queries, it is closely related to the distance between record values; for prefix queries, the length
of the longest common prefix. A general approximate reconstruction attack should recover values that
are close (for γ) to the actual record values, and lower bounds on closeness (for γ) should imply lower
bounds on the accuracy of any approximate reconstruction attack. The following theorem gives one
such lower bound on the number of queries necessary for any approximate reconstruction attack on any
query class, as a function of the desired accuracy ε and the VC dimension d of the query class.
Theorem 6.1. Let Q be a class of queries on [N ], πq a query distribution, and C = (Q,C) the associated
concept space with VC dimension d > 1. Let γ(i, j)
def
= Prπq [ ∆(Ci, Cj) ] be the distance metric induced
on [N ] by Q and πq. Consider any algorithm that takes as input a database of size R with elements in
[N ], together with the access pattern leakage of m queries sampled from πq, and outputs an approximation
DB′ such that γ(DB[i], DB′[i]) ≤ ε for all i ∈ [1, . . . , R], with probability of success at least 1− δ (over







This result is a direct application of PAC learning theory: an algorithm that takes any database
as input and outputs a DB′ satisfying the stated condition is a PAC learner for the concept space C
defined in the theorem statement. We can thus apply a general lower bound [EHKV89] on the sample




δ ). With a smaller number
of queries m, there will be, with probability at least δ, two values in [N ] whose distance γ is strictly
greater than ε, but which every query given to the algorithm accessed in the same way.
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This result is not easy to interpret, so we briefly reflect on its implications. First, it holds even if
the adversary knows the exact query distribution and database distribution. Next, note that the same
lower bound holds for the existence of an ε-net: if the queries fail to form an ε-net for the metric γ, then
some records that are more than ε apart in γ cannot be separated based on access pattern. Since any
approximate attack should be able to distinguish such records, in some sense this approximate equality
attack is a minimal approximate attack. For example, consider both our sacrifical ε-ADR and -AOR
attacks from Sections 4 and 5. Recovering approximate values or a partition into buckets with small
diameters implies we are able to group together approximately-equal records. From this perspective,
the lower bound on the existence of an ε-net for γ may be interpreted as a lower bound on the number of
queries necessary for any form of approximate attack for which γ is a relevant notion of distance—not
only an approximate attack attempting to recover values, as in Theorem 6.1.
7 Conclusions
This work initiates the application of learning theory to attacks on encrypted databases which leak
access patterns. Our learning-theoretic viewpoint lets us build and analyze approximate reconstruction
attacks which are both nearly-optimal in query complexity and effective on real data. We believe this
work represents an exciting first step towards building a cohesive theory of security in the presence
of access pattern leakage. Towards this, we recommend two main research directions for future work
to pursue: first, extend our attacks to other query types of practical importance like edit distance,
wildcard, and substring queries. Second, study and apply other results from learning theory, such as
active or online learning, to access pattern leakage attacks and defenses.
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A Query Complexity for Reconstruction with Known Queries
In this section, we prove that the dependency on the number of records R can be removed from Theo-
rem 3.1. This is formalized in Theorem A.1.
Recall the following notation from Section 3. We can think of a database DB with R records having
values in [N ] as being a vector of length R with values in [N ]; the value of record j is DB[j]. We
construct a concept space C = (Q,C) as follows. The points in the ground set are the possible queries
q ∈ Q. We write q(i) = 1 when value i ∈ [N ] matches query q. We set Ci = {q ∈ Q | q(i) = 1}. We
then define C = {Ci : i ∈ [N ]}.
Theorem A.1. Let Q be a class of queries and C = (Q,C) be the concept space constructed as above.
Let πq be any distribution over Q. Let d be the VC dimension of C, and assume d is finite. Then,
there is an adversary such that for any database DB, given as input m ∈ O(dε log
d
εδ ) queries sampled
from πq and their access pattern leakage on DB, the adversary outputs a database DB
′ such that
Prπq [ q(DB[j]) 6= q(DB′[j]) ] ≤ ε holds simultaneously for all j ∈ [R], with probability at least 1− δ.
Remark. The statement above is identical to Theorem 3.1, except the probability of success is
1 − δ instead of 1 − Rδ. In reality, there is small price to pay: the required number of queries is
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increased, essentially by a factor (at most) two. This is not reflected in the statement since the factor
two disappears into the O() notation.
Before proving Theorem A.1, we start with a short lemma. Given a concept class (X,C), C∆ denotes
the set of symmetric differences of elements of C; that is:
C∆ def= {∆(A,B) : A,B ∈ C}
where ∆(·, ·) denotes the symmetric difference of the input sets.
Lemma A.2. Let (X,C) be an arbitrary concept class with finite VC dimension. Then the VC dimension
of (X,C∆) is also finite. Moreover it is at most twice the VC dimension of (X,C).
Proof. The proof of the lemma is identical to standard proofs of the same result for e.g. unions. Namely,
let d denote the VC dimension of (X,C). Then the growth function of (X,C) is O(nd) as a function
of the number of points n (see Section 2). Hence given n points in X, C induces O(nd) subsamples,
hence symmetric differences of two elements in C can only induce O(n2d) subsamples, hence the VC
dimension of C∆ is at most 2d.
Remark. This bound is tight. This can be seen by starting from an arbitrary concept space (X,C)
of VC dimension d, and forming the concept space (X2,C2) with X2 = X× {0, 1} and C2 = {C × {i} :
C ∈ C, i ∈ {0, 1}}. It can be checked that the VC dimension of (X2,C2) is d, and the VC dimension of
(X2,C∆2 ) is 2d.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem A.1. The proof is no longer a “generic” reduction to PAC
learning. Instead, the proof uses the ε-net theorem (Theorem 2.5) directly.
Proof of Theorem A.1. We choose as adversary any adversary that outputs any database DB′ that is
consistent with the observed leakage. Such a database exists, since DB must be consistent with its own
leakage. (As with general PAC learning, there is no guarantee that the adversary is efficient.) Next we
pick a sample size m large enough to ensure that the sample is an ε-net for the concept space (X,C∆).
By Lemma A.2, the VC dimension of that concept space is at most 2d. By the ε-net theorem, it follows
that m ∈ O(dε log
d
εδ ) suffices to ensure that the sample forms an ε-net with probability at least 1 − δ.
We claim that this choice of adversary and m satisfies the conclusion of the theorem.
To see this, assume the sample is an ε-net, which holds with probability at least 1 − δ. Let DB′
be the database output by the adversary. Assume towards contradiction that there exists j ∈ [R] such
that Prπq [ q(DB[j]) 6= q(DB′[j]) ] > ε. This last expression is equivalent to saying that the measure
of ∆(CDB[j], CDB′[j]) according to πq is greater than ε. Since the sample is an ε-net for C∆, it must
contain a point in ∆(CDB[j], CDB′[j]). This point is a (known) query that matches record j in DB but
not in DB′, or conversely. Hence the database DB′ output by the adversary is not consistent with the
sample, a contradiction.
B Query Complexity of GeneralizedKKNO
B.1 Algorithm
Throughout, we assume εN is a strictly positive integer1. For simplicity (to avoid the proliferation of
rounding) we also assume N/4 is an integer. Recall that for k ∈ [1, N ], Ak denotes the set of ranges in
1This is without loss of generality, because the relevant quantity in the definition of sacrificial ε-ADR is dεNe. That is,
εN can be replaced by dεNe everywhere in the definition, and this does not affect whether it is satisfied.
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[1, N ] that contain the value k. The probability that a uniformly random range contains the value k,






k(N + 1− k).
We have:
p(k + δ)− p(k) = 2
N(N + 1)
δ(N + 1− 2k − δ). (2)
The full GeneralizedKKNO algorithm is given in Algorithm 5. Note that arg min is computed
over the integers. On the other hand, throughout the analysis, we extend the functions p and d to be
defined over rationals rather than just integers, using the same polynomial expressions.
Algorithm 5 ADR Algorithm GeneralizedKKNO.
GeneralizedKKNO(Q):
Input: Set of queries Q.
Output: Function est-val approximating val.
1: est-symval← GetEstsymval(Q) . Step 1
2: est-val← GetEstval(Q, est-symval) . Step 2
3: return est-val
GetEstsymval(Q):
1: for each record r do
2: c(r)← |{q ∈ Q : r ∈ q}|/|Q|





2: rA ← arg minr |est-symval(r)−N/4| . Anchor record
3: est-val(rA)← est-symval(rA)
4: for each record r 6= rA do
5: c′(r)← |{q ∈ Q : rA, r ∈ q}|/|Q|
6: if c′(r) > min{est-val(rA), est-symval(r)}/N then
7: est-val(r)← est-symval(r)
8: else




Finally, we recall that sacrificial ε-approximate database reconstruction (sacrificial ε-ADR) is said
to succeed iff one of the following two events occur:
1. For every record r such that val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ], |est-val(r)− val(r)| < εN .
2. For every record r such that val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ], |est-val(r)− (N + 1− val(r))| < εN .
We now state our main result.
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queries, GeneralizedKKNO achieves sacrificial ε-ADR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
The proof of the theorem is given in the next section.
B.2 Analysis
Throughout, ε < 1/4 denotes the target precision, and Q the set of queries. We assume that the anchor
record has a value less than N/2. If not, it means we will ultimately recover the reflection of the record
values, instead of the record values themselves, but it does not affect the success of the algorithm.
Indeed it simply means we will ultimately satisfy condition (2) in the definition of sacrificial ε-ADR
instead of condition (1). (This assumption is where the two possible success conditions are separated.)
Our goal in this section is to prove Theorem B.1. The overall structure of GeneralizedKKNO
is as follows. In Step 1 of the algorithm, GetEstsymval approximates the symmetric value of every
record. In Step 2, GetEstval determines, for each record, on which side of the reflection symmetry
around (N + 1)/2 the record falls (relative to a chosen anchor record). We analyze each of these two
steps in turn.
Step 1. Analysis of GetEstsymval. First, we introduce the following concept space, which will play
a crucial role in the analysis. Define the ground set X as the set of all ranges in [1, N ], and the concept
set C as the set of all Ak’s, i.e. C
def
= {Ak : k ∈ [N ]}.
Lemma B.2. The growth function of (X,C) is 2n, and its VC dimension is 2.
Proof. Let S be any sample of n ranges, say S = {[a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn]}. Consider the set of points Y
defined as follows:
Y := {1, N + 1} ∪ {ai}1≤i≤n ∪ {bi + 1}1≤i≤n .
It contains some ` ≤ 2n+2 elements, y1 ≤ . . . ≤ y`, where y1 = 1 and y` = N+1. Notice that whenever
two distinct integers k1 and k2 lie in the same interval [yi, yi+1[, they must match exactly the same
subset of queries in S, since all queries match both or neither of them. Formally, S ∩ Ak1 = S ∩ Ak2 .
Given that ` points create `− 1 intervals, the growth function is at most `− 1.
If ` ≤ 2n + 1, then ` − 1 ≤ 2n, so we are done. If ` = 2n + 2, then all left endpoints ai must be
strictly greater than y1 = 1 and all right endpoints bi + 1 must be strictly less than y` = N + 1. In that
case, for any k1 ∈ [y1, y2[ and k2 ∈]y`−1, y`], S ∩Ak1 = S ∩Ak2 = ∅, so the growth function is again at
most 2n.
We now show this bound is tight by constructing a set S of n ranges such that S ∩ Ak takes 2n
distinct values as k spans [N ]. Consider the set of range queries S = {[1, n], [2, n+ 1], . . . , [n, 2n− 1]}.
For N ≥ 2n, the resulting set Y is {1, 2, . . . , 2n,N + 1}, with |Y | = ` = 2n + 1. Each of the sets
Ak for k = 1, . . . , 2n induces a distinct subsample of S: for k in {1, . . . , n}, the induced subsample is
{[1, n], . . . , [k, n+ k− 1]}, while for k ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n− 1}, it is {[k− n+ 1, k], . . . , [n, 2n− 1]}, and for
k = 2n, it is the empty subsample ∅.
Hence, the growth function of (X,C) is 2n (assuming N ≥ 2n). Since C induces at most 2n
subsamples in a sample of size n, and shattering a sample requires 2n subsamples, the size of the largest
sample that can be shattered, and thus the VC dimension of this concept space, is 2.
We now turn to analyzing GetEstsymval. In the main body of this work, we have argued that
GetEstsymval succeeds within O(ε−4 log ε−1) queries. We now formalize and prove that statement.
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queries, the following event simultaneously holds for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
|est-symval(r)− symval(r)| < c1εN
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 5.
Proof. Let us consider a record r with value v = val(r). Recall that est-symval(r) = | arg mink∈[N/2](c(r)−
p(k))|. Note that the probability p that a value is hit by a uniform query is monotone increasing over
[1, N/2]. It follows that for the event | arg mink∈[N/2](c(r) − p(k))| ≤ c1εN to hold for r, it is enough
that:
p(v − c1εN) ≤ c(r) ≤ p(v + c1εN).
Since c(r) converges towards p(v), the previous equation holds iff c(r) does not deviate from its expected
value p(v) by more than:
max (p(v)− p(v − c1εN), p(v + c1εN)− p(v)) .
Elementary analysis shows that the previous quantity is minimized (thus maximizing the constraint





· c1εN · (1 + c1εN)
= Θ(ε2)
where the second line uses Equation (2).
Thus we only need the empirical approximation c(r) of p(v) to be correct within an (additive) factor
Θ(ε2). Using the concept space (X,C), a direct application of the ε-sample theorem (with Θ(ε2) in place
of the “ε” of the theorem) yields the result.
Before moving on to the next step, we refine the previous analysis to show that within the same query
complexity, GetEstsymval is able to approximate the value of each record r to within ε · symval(r)
(which is better than the εN of Lemma B.3). The price to pay is that we sacrifice some records with
values within O(εN) of the endpoints 1 and N . This improvement will be useful later on.
















queries, the following event simultaneously holds for all records r such that symval(r) ≥ c3εN , except
with probability at most δ:
|est-symval(r)− symval(r)| < c2ε · symval(r)
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 5.
Proof. Fix a record r, and let k = symval(r) ∈ [N/2]. We separate two cases based on k.
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• Case 1: k > N/4. In that case k = Θ(N), so Lemma B.3 suffices to conclude.
• Case 2: k ≤ N/4. In that case we follow exactly the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma B.3,
with c2εk playing the role of c1εN , up until the point where we seek to minimize the quantity:
max (p(k)− p(k − c2εk), p(k + c2εk)− p(k)) .
This time around, because k ≤ N/4, and because p is concave, the minimum is reached for





· c2εk · (N/2 + 1 + c2εk)
= Θ(εk/N)
= Ω(ε2)
where the second line uses Equation (2), and the last line uses the assumption k ≥ c3εN . At this
point we can conclude exactly like in Lemma B.3.
Step 2. Analysis of GetEstval. In this second step, our goal is to show that GetEstval places all
records on the correct side of N/2, relative to the chosen anchor record rA, except for records close to
1, N/2 and (N + 1)/2, which will be handled separately.
We will make use of the concept space (X,C′) where the ground set X is the set of all ranges, and each
concept in C′ is the set of queries hitting a given value k together with a fixed anchor value vA = val(rA)
(i.e. each value k yields one concept {[x, y] ⊆ [N ] : vA, k ∈ [x, y]}). A straightforward adaptation of the
proof of Lemma B.2 shows that (X,C′) has VC dimension 2.
First, we treat the case where ε = 1/N , which requires special attention. Recall that sacrificial
1/N -ADR is equivalent to full database reconstruction.
Lemma B.5. Let δ > 0. After
O
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queries, GeneralizedKKNO achieves full database reconstruction with probability of success at least
1− δ.
Proof. Using Lemma B.3 with ε = 1/N and c1 = 1, we can ensure est-symval(r) = symval(r) for all r. It
remains to show that for each record r, GetEstval correctly determines which side of N/2 the record
r is relative to rA, so that GetEstval returns the correct choice for est-val.
Fix a record r. Let a = min(symval(r), symval(rA)) and b = max(symval(r), symval(rA)). Assume
that r and rA are on opposite sides of (N + 1)/2 (the other case is very similar). Observe that c
′(r)

























It follows that for the algorithm to succeed, it is enough that c′(r) be within Ω(1/N2) of its expected
value. Using the concept space (X,C′) (where we recall that each concept corresponds to the set of ranges
containing a given value k together with the anchor value vA = val(rA)), a direct application of the
ε-sample theorem with ε = Ω(1/N2) yields the result.
We now remove the assumption εN = 1 and treat the general case. We distinguish two cases, based
on whether there exists a “good” anchor record or not within the database. First, we will assume that
every record in the database has values within εN/4 of 1, N and (N + 1)/2. This is the case where no
good anchor record exists. Note that the adversary does not know that fact, but that is immaterial:
what we will show is that the same algorithm GeneralizedKKNO succeeds whether a good anchor
record exists or not. The following lemma handles this first case.
Lemma B.6. Let δ > 0. Assume all records r satisfy val(r) ∈ [1, 1 + εN/4] ∪ [(N + 1)/2− εN/4, (N +
















queries, GeneralizedKKNO achieves sacrificial ε-ADR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
Proof. First, note that the definition of sacrificial ε-ADR makes no claim about records within εN/4
of 1 or N , so we can focus purely on those records whose values lie within εN/4 of (N + 1)/2. Fix
a record r such that |(N + 1)/2 − val(r)| ≤ εN/4. Then |(N + 1)/2 − symval(r)| ≤ εN/4. We apply
Lemma B.3 with c1 = 1/4. We get |(N + 1)/2 − est-symval(r)| ≤ εN/2. Hence, whether GetEstval
returns est-symval(r) or N + 1 − est-symval(r), we always have |(N + 1)/2 − est-val(r)| ≤ εN/2. Since
we also have |(N + 1)/2− val(r)| ≤ εN/4, we get |val(r)− est-val(r)| < εN .
We are now free to assume that there exists a record r with symval(r) ∈]1+εN/4, (N+1)/2−εN/4[.
This is the case where a good anchor record exists, and it is handled by the following lemma.

















queries, GeneralizedKKNO achieves sacrificial ε-ADR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
Proof. Let r be as in the assumption of the lemma. Then |symval(r)−N/4| < N/4 + 1/2− εN/4. Using
Lemma B.3 with c1 = 1/16, we get |est-symval(r) − N/4| < N/4 + 1/2 − (1/4 − 1/16)εN . Since rA is
chosen such that est-symval(rA) is closest to N/4, the same inequality applies to rA. Finally, because we
have applied Lemma B.3 with c1 = 1/16, we can deduce that |symval(rA)−N/4| < N/4 + 1/2− εN/8.
First, consider the case that εN ≤ 16. In that case ε = N/16, so O(ε−4 log ε−1 + ε−4 log δ−1) is the
same as O(N4 logN+N4 log δ−1), and we can apply Lemma B.5 to achieve full database reconstruction
within that query complexity. In particular we achieve sacrificial ε-ADR, so we are done. Hence in
the remainder we are free to assume εN > 16. In that case the inequality |symval(rA) − N/4| <
N/4 + 1/2− εN/8 from earlier implies




Fix a record r. We want to show that the algorithm succeeds for that record. Let us first consider
the case that |(N + 1)/2 − val(r)| ≤ εN/4. In that case we can apply Lemma B.3 with c1 = 1/4, and
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apply exactly the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma B.6: whichever value GetEstval returns
of est-symval(r) or N + 1− est-symval(r), we always have |(N + 1)/2− est-val(r)| ≤ εN/2. Since we also
have |(N + 1)/2− val(r)| ≤ εN/4, we get |val(r)− est-val(r)| < εN , so the algorithm succeeds for that
record r. Hence we are free to assume |(N + 1)/2 − val(r)| > εN/4. Further, since we are targeting
sacrificial ε-ADR, we are also free to assume symval(r) ≥ εN . In combination (and using εN > 16), the
previous two observations yield:
1 + Ω(εN) ≤ symval(r) ≤ N
2
− Ω(εN). (4)
By Equation (3), the same holds for the anchor rA.
We can now tackle the main part of the proof. We want to show is that GetEstval correctly
determines which side of (N + 1)/2 the record r is relative to rA, so that GetEstval returns the
correct choice for est-val. Let:
a = min(symval(r), symval(rA))
b = max(symval(r), symval(rA))
a′ = min(est-symval(r), est-symval(rA))
b′ = max(est-symval(r), est-symval(rA)).
An important remark is that because the same equations Equations (3) and (4) hold for both r and rA,
they also hold for a and b. Assume that r and rA are on opposite sides of (N+1)/2 (the other case is very
similar). Observe that c′(r) converges towards 2ab/(N(N + 1)), and the algorithm succeeds if c′(r) is
less than a′/N . Because a = Ω(εN), we can use Lemma B.4 to ensure est-symval(r) ≥ symval(r)(1−c2ε),
for a constant c2 > 0 of our choice; and likewise for rA. It follows that a














(1− c2ε− 1 + Ω(ε))
≥ Ω(ε) (Ω(ε)− c2ε) .
Since we are free to pick c2 > 0 arbitrarily, we choose it to be small enough that the above quantity is
Ω(ε2).
As a result, for the algorithm to succeed, it is enough that c′(r) be within Ω(ε2) of its expected
value. Using the concept space (X,C′) (where we recall that each concept corresponds to the set of
ranges containing a given value k together with the anchor value vA = val(rA)), a direct application
of the ε-sample theorem (with Ω(ε2) playing the role of the “ε” in the theorem statement) yields the
result.
It is clear that Lemmas B.6 and B.7 together imply Theorem B.1, so we are done.
C Query Complexity of ApproxValue
C.1 Algorithm
The general setup and notation are the same as for the analysis of GeneralizedKKNO. Throughout,
we assume εN is a strictly positive integer2. For simplicity (to avoid the proliferation of rounding) we
2This is without loss of generality, because the relevant quantity in the definition of sacrificial ε-ADR is dεNe. That is,
εN can be replaced by dεNe everywhere in the definition, and this does not affect whether it is satisfied.
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k(N + 1− k).
We have:
p(k + δ)− p(k) = 2
N(N + 1)
δ(N + 1− 2k − δ). (5)
Similarly, for a given anchor value vA ∈ [1, N ], the probability that a given value k is hit together








k(N + 1− vA) if k ≤ vA
vA(N + 1− k) if k > vA.
Intuitively, d(vA, k) measures a type of distance between the anchor value vA and the target value k.
Indeed the closer the two values are, the more likely they are to be hit by the same query. Note that
d(k, k) = p(k).
During the analysis, we will make use of the concept space (X,C) (resp. (X,C′)), where the ground
set X is the set of all ranges in [N ], and the concept set C (resp. C′) is the set of all ranges containing a
given value k (resp. containing a given value k together with a fixed anchor value vA = val(rA)). That is,
each value k yields the concept {[x, y] ⊆ [N ] : k ∈ [x, y]} ∈ C (resp. {[x, y] ⊆ [N ] : vA, k ∈ [x, y]} ∈ C′).
In the analysis of GeneralizedKKNO, we have seen that both concept spaces have VC dimension 2.
For convenience, we recall the ApproxValue algorithm in Algorithm 6. Note that arg min is
computed over the integers. On the other hand, throughout the analysis, we extend the functions p and
d to be defined over rationals rather than just integers, using the same polynomial expressions.
Algorithm 6 ADR Algorithm ApproxValue.
ApproxValue(Q):
Input: Set of queries Q.
Output: Function est-val approximating val.
1: for each record r do
2: c(r)← |{q ∈ Q : r ∈ q}|/|Q|
3: ṽ(r)← arg mink |c(r)− p(k)|
4: end for
5: rA ← arg minr |ṽ(r)−N/4| . Anchor record
6: ṽA ← ṽ(rA) . Est. anchor value
7: for each record r do
8: c′(r)← |{q ∈ Q : rA, r ∈ q}|/|Q|
9: w̃L ← arg mink∈[1,ṽA] |d(ṽA, k)− c
′(r)|
10: w̃R ← arg mink∈[ṽA,N ] |d(ṽA, k)− c
′(r)|






Finally, we recall that sacrificial ε-approximate database reconstruction (sacrificial ε-ADR) is said
to succeed iff one of the following two events occur:
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1. For every record r such that val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ], |est-val(r)− val(r)| < εN .
2. For every record r such that val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ], |est-val(r)− (N + 1− val(r))| < εN .
We now state our main result.

















queries, ApproxValue achieves sacrificial ε-ADR with probability of success at least 1− δ.
The proof of the theorem is given in the next section.
C.2 Analysis
Our goal in this section is to prove Theorem C.1. Throughout this section, we assume the condition of
Theorem C.1 is satisfied, i.e. there exists a record r0 such that 0.2N < symval(r0) < 0.3N .
At a high level, Algorithm 6 proceeds by first choosing an anchor record rA, and approximating
its value using the empirical probability c(rA) that it is hit by a query. This yields an approximation
ṽA of the value of the anchor record. The anchor record is then used to approximate the value of all
other records using the empirical probability c′(r) that a query hits both the anchor record rA and the
target record r whose value we are approximating. This yields two candidate approximate values w̃L
and w̃R for val(r), depending on whether val(r) is to the left or right of the anchor—we say that the two
values are “reflections” around the anchor, by analogy with what happens in the GeneralizedKKNO
Algorithm. Finally the empirical probability c(r) that record r is hit by a query is once again used to
decide which of the values w̃L or w̃R is the correct one, by checking which of the two choices predicts
c(r) more accurately.
The success of Algorithm 6 depends on successive approximations holding with sufficient precision,
so that the final output achieves a precision of εN (within the claimed number of queries). The formal
proof below proceeds in three main steps. In a nutshell, the first step is to show that the approximation
ṽA of the value of the anchor record rA is sufficiently precise. The second step is to deduce that for every
record r, one of the two values w̃L and w̃R is an approximation of the target record value val(r) with
sufficient precision. The third step is to show that the condition on Line 11 of the algorithm correctly
determines which of the two previous values is the correct one (except possibly for records whose value
is within εN of either 1 or N). Finally we will put all three steps together to conclude the proof.
We now move on to the actual proof. Throughout, ε < 1/4 denotes the target precision, and Q the
set of queries. We assume that the anchor record has a value less than N/2. If not, it means we will
ultimately recover the reflection of the record values, instead of the record values themselves, but it
does not affect the success of the algorithm. Indeed it simply means we will ultimately satisfy condition
(2) in the definition of sacrificial ε-ADR instead of condition (1). (This assumption is where the two
possible success conditions are separated.)
Step 1. Approximation of the anchor record value (lines 1-6 of Algorithm 6). Let rA denote the anchor
record as computed in Line 5 of Algorithm 6, and let vA
def
= val(rA) denote its value. In Algorithm 6
this value is approximated by ṽA. Our first goal is to show that ṽA is a “good enough” approximation
of vA. This will be the result of two sub-steps. In Step 1a, we show that vA is sufficiently close to N/4.
In Step 1b, we deduce that ṽA is sufficiently close to vA.
Recall that we assume vA ≤ N/2. As a result, we focus our analysis on values in [1, N/2].
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Step 1a. In this sub-step, we first require that for all records r (with values in [1, N/2]), when
approximating val(r) by ṽ(r), the approximation is wrong by no more than N/20. More precisely we
prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.2. Let δ > 0. Then O(log δ−1) queries suffice for the following event:∣∣ṽ(r)− val(r)∣∣ ≤ N/20
to simultaneously hold for every record r such that val(r) ≤ N/2, except with probability at most δ.
Proof. This proof is essentially the same as in the first step of the GeneralizedKKNO algorithm,
where we have set ε = 1/20. For the sake of completeness we recall it here. Let us consider a record
r with value v = val(r). Recall that ṽ(r) = | arg mink(c(r) − p(k))|. Note that the probability p that
a value is hit by a uniform query is monotone increasing over [1, N/2]. It follows that for the event
| arg mink(c(r)− p(k))| ≤ N/20 to hold for r, it is enough that:
p(v −N/20) ≤ c(r) ≤ p(v +N/20).
Since c(r) converges towards p(v), the previous equation holds iff c(r) does not deviate from its expected
value p(v) by more than:
max (p(v)− p(v −N/20), p(v +N/20)− p(v)) .
Elementary analysis shows that the previous quantity is minimized (thus maximizing the constraint









where the second line uses Equation (5).
Thus we only need the empirical approximation c(r) of p(v) to be correct within a constant (additive)
factor. Using the concept space (X,C) (where we recall that each concept corresponds to the set of
ranges containing a given value k), a direct application of the ε-sample theorem with constant ε yields
the result.
Since by hypothesis there exists a record r with (symmetric) value within [0.2N, 0.3N ], it fol-
lows from Lemma C.2 that after O(log δ−1) queries, for that particular record r, we have ṽ(r) ∈
[0.15N, 0.35N ]. Since by construction the anchor record rA minimizes |ṽ(rA) − N/4|, it follows that
ṽ(rA) ∈ [0.15N, 0.35N ]. By Lemma C.2 again, afterO(log δ−1) queries, we can deduce vA ∈ [0.1N, 0.4N ].
That makes the anchor record “good enough” for our purpose, and concludes Step 1a of the proof.
Step 1b. Our aim in this step is to show that ṽA is a good enough approximation of vA. More
precisely, we want to prove the following.
















queries, the following event holds except with probability at most δ:
|ṽA − vA| ≤ c1εN.
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Proof. Recall we are assuming the value vA of the anchor record is less than N/2. In fact, using
Lemma C.2, by paying O(log δ−1) queries we can assume vA ∈ [0.1N, 0.4N ].
Note that the probability p that a value is hit by a uniform query is monotone increasing over
[1, N/2]. It follows that to ensure |ṽA − vA| ≤ c1εN , it is enough to have:
p(vA − c1εN) ≤ c(rA) ≤ p(vA + c1εN).
As in the proof of Lemma C.2, since c(rA) converges towards p(vA), the previous equation holds iff
c(rA) does not deviate from its expected value p(vA) by more than:
max (p(vA)− p(vA − c1εN), p(vA + c1εN)− p(vA)) .
Because p is concave and increasing over [1, N/2] and all previous values lie within that range, the
maximum is reached for vA = 0.4N with:




c1εN(N + 1− 0.8N − c1εN)
= Ω(ε).
where the second line uses Equation (5), and the last line uses c1ε < 1/2 · 1/4 < 0.2 (and that c1 is
constant).
Thus it is enough that the empirical probability c(rA) be within Ω(ε) of its expected value p(vA).
Even though we need the approximation to hold only for a single value, that value was not fixed and
known in advance. On the contrary, the anchor record was chosen based on the empirical probability
it is hit by a range query, which biases its distribution. As a result a simple bound such as a Hoeffding
bound does not directly apply. We circumvent that problem by requiring that the approximation hold
for all values. To that end, we once again use the concept space (X,C). A direct application of the
ε-sample theorem yields the result.
Step 2. Approximation of the target record value, up to reflection around the anchor (lines 7-10 of
Algorithm 6). Informally, our goal in this step is to prove that for every record r with value v
def
= val(r),
if v is to the left (resp. right) of the anchor value, i.e. v ≤ vA (resp. v ≥ vA), then wL (resp. wR) is a
good enough approximation of v. In the remainder we focus on the case v ≥ vA; the other case is very
similar. Hence our goal is to show that w̃R is a good enough approximation of v.
To that end, recall that vA = val(rA), and let wR
def
= arg mink∈[vA,N ] |d(vA, k)− c
′(r)|. That is, wR is
computed in exactly the same way as w̃R, except using the actual value vA of the anchor record rather
than its approximation ṽA. We proceed in two lemmas. The first lemma shows that v is close to wR.
The second lemma shows that wR is close to w̃R. As in the previous step, “close enough” is defined as
being within c2ε of each other, for some constant c2.
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r such that val(r) ≥ vA, except with
probability at most δ:
|val(r)− wR| ≤ c2εN
where wR = arg mink∈[vA,N ] |d(vA, k)− c
′(r)|, and vA = val(rA).
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Proof. Fix a target record r with v = val(r) ≥ vA. The main point is that c′(r) converges towards
d(vA, k). Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma C.2, a sufficient condition for our goal
|v − wR| ≤ c2εN to hold is that:
d(vA, v − c2εN) ≤ c′(r) ≤ d(vA, v + c2εN) (6)
as long as vA+c2εN ≤ v ≤ N−c2εN . In the case where vA ≤ v < vA+c2εN (resp. N−c2εN < v ≤ N),
the first (resp. second) inequality in Equation (6) is unnecessary. For simplicity we focus on the case
vA + c2εN ≤ v ≤ N − c2εN where both inequalities are necessary; the analysis easily extends to the
other two cases.
By Step 1, after O(log δ−1) queries, we are free to assume vA ∈ [0.1N, 0.4N ]. On the other hand,
by definition of d, and because vA + c2εN ≤ v ≤ N − c2εN , we have:






where the last line uses vA ≥ 0.1N = Ω(N).
Using the concept space (X,C′) (where we recall that each concept corresponds to the set of ranges
containing a given value k together with the anchor value vA), a direct application of the ε-sample
theorem yields the result.
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r such that val(r) ≥ vA, except with
probability at most δ:
|w̃R − wR| ≤ c3εN
where wR = arg mink∈[vA,N ] |d(vA, k)−c
′(r)|, vA = val(rA), and ṽA, w̃R are computed as in Algorithm 6.
Proof. Since the mapping x 7→ d(vA, x) is affine, the output of arg minx∈[vA,N ] |d(vA, x)− c
′(r)| can be
easily computed over the rationals. Indeed if we let γ
def
= c′(r), then it suffices to solves the equation:
2
N(N + 1)
vA(N + 1− x) = γ
which yields:
x = N + 1− N(N + 1)γ
2vA
.
For ease of exposition, we will first ignore integer rounding issues, and pretend that the above
quantity is exactly the output of arg minx∈[vA,N ] |d(vA, x)− c
′(r)|, so that





Likewise for w̃R. We will examine the impact of integer rounding on the reasoning later on. We get:








≤ N(N + 1)
2
· |ṽA − vA|
ṽAvA
where the second line uses γ ≤ 1.
Applying the results in Step 1, after O
(
ε−2 log ε−1 + ε−2 log δ−1
)
queries, with arbitrarily high con-
stant probability we have |ṽA − vA| ≤ c1εN (with the assumption c1 ≤ 1/2) and ṽA, vA ∈ [0.1N, 0.4N ].
It follows that the previous quantity is O(c1ε). Hence it is less than C · c1ε for some constant C, so
choosing c1 = min(1/2, c3/C) yields the desired result.
It remains to discuss rounding issues. In reality the arg min in the definition of wR and w̃R is
computed over integers. Adapting the previous reasoning to take this into account ultimately yields a
bound |w̃R − wR| ≤ c3εN + 1 instead of |w̃R − wR| ≤ c3εN as desired. That issue can be avoided as
follows. We consider two cases, depending on the value of c3εN . Essentially the dichotomy is that in
the first case, c3εN is large enough that rounding errors don’t matter; and in the second case it is small
enough that we can afford to trivialize the lemma and get rid of rounding errors entirely.
• Case 1: c3εN ≥ 2. Then we can apply the previous reasoning, replacing c3 with the value
c′3
def
= c3/2. We obtain a bound c
′
3εN + 1 ≤ c3εN , so we are done.
• Case 2: c3εN < 2. In that case we can apply Lemma C.3 with ε = 1/N and c1 < 1. This costs
O(N2 logN) queries, which is also O(ε−2 log ε−1) since c3εN < 2 and c3 is a constant. This yields
|ṽA − vA| < 1, which in turn implies ṽA = vA since they are both integers. It follows immediately
that w̃R = wR and we are done.
This concludes the proof of Lemma C.5.
Putting the previous two proofs together we get the following lemma.
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
|val(r)− w̃L| ≤ c4εN if val(r) ≤ vA
|val(r)− w̃R| ≤ c4εN if val(r) ≥ vA
where wL, w̃L, wR, w̃R, vA, ṽA, are defined as previously.
Proof. The second inequality comes directly from combining Lemmas C.4 and C.5. Since we are aiming
to show a bound on the number of queries sufficient to succeed except with probability at most δ,
and the previous two lemmas held in the same setting, the bounds can be added in a straightforward
manner, by requiring a probability of failure at most δ/2 in each lemma and using a union bound. The
first inequality can be proven in a similar way, and combined with the first as previously.
Step 3. Correctly determining reflection around the anchor (lines 11-15 of Algorithm 6). At the out-
come of Step 2, we have essentially shown that for every record, one of w̃L or w̃R is a good approximation
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of the record value (whp after the required number of queries). Now it remains to show that the test on
line 11 of Algorithm 6 is able to correctly determine which of the two values is the correct approximation
(except for values within εN of 1 or N ; or for values near the anchor, for which both approximations are
close anyway). We proceed in two steps, with Lemmas C.9 and C.10 being the main lemmas. The first
lemma shows that if w̃L (resp. w̃R) is the correct approximation, then c(r) is sufficiently close to p(w̃L)
(resp. p(w̃R)); the second lemma shows that p(w̃R) and p(w̃R) are far enough apart for the relevant
value ranges. We will then put both lemmas together to reach the desired conclusion.
















queries, the following event simultaneously holds for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
|c(r)− p(val(r))| ≤ c5ε
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 6.
Proof. The is a direct application of the ε-sample theorem to the concept space (X,C).
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r such that val(r) ≥ vA, except with
probability at most δ: ∣∣p(w̃R)− p(val(r))∣∣ ≤ c6ε
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 6.
Proof. Applying Lemma C.6 with c4 = c6, the claimed number of queries suffices to ensure
∣∣w̃R −
val(r)
∣∣ ≤ c6εN . Using Equation (5), we get:∣∣p(w̃R)− p(val(r))∣∣
≤ 1
N(N + 1)
c6εN |N + 1− val(r)− w̃R|
≤ c6ε
which is what we wanted.
Combining Lemmas C.7 and C.8 yields the following corollary.
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
|c(r)− p(w̃L)| ≤ c7ε if val(r) ≤ vA
|c(r)− p(w̃R)| ≤ c7ε if val(r) ≥ vA
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 6.
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Proof. The proof follows in a straightforward manner from combining Lemmas C.7 and C.8, using the
same approach as in the proof of Lemma C.6.
Now we want to show that p(w̃R) is far apart from p(w̃L) (except for specific choices of val(r) that
will be handled later).
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
if val(r) 6∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ]
∪ [ṽA − εN/4, ṽA + εN/4]
then |p(w̃R)− p(w̃L)| ≥ c8ε
where all quantities involved are computed as in Algorithm 6.
Proof. For ease of exposition, we ignore rounding issues and regard arg min as operating over rationals
rather than integers. Rounding issues can then be handled as in the proof of Lemma C.5. Likewise, we
ignore the case where c′(r) does not fall into the range of x 7→ d(ṽA, x) over the domains [1, ṽA] and
[ṽA, N ]: this is without loss of generality, as those cases imply that val(r) is either 1, ṽA or N (whp after
O( 1
ε2
log 1ε ) queries, by Lemma C.6), and all those cases are excluded in the statement of the current
lemma.
As shown in Step 1, we can assume ṽA ∈ [0.15N, 0.35N ], so in particular ṽA ≤ N/2, from which
it follows that N + 1 − w̃R ≥ w̃L, which implies that p(w̃R) ≥ p(w̃L). Hence, in order to lower-bound
|p(w̃R)− p(w̃L)|, it will be enough to lower-bound p(w̃R)− p(w̃L).
In the remainder we assume val(r) ≥ ṽA. The case val(r) ≤ ṽA is very similar.
If we let w̃L (resp. w̃R) be defined as in line 9 (resp. line 10) of Algorithm 6, except computed over
the rationals rather than the integers, then we get:
d(ṽA, w̃L) = d(ṽA, w̃R)
=⇒ w̃L(N + 1− ṽA) = ṽA(N + 1− w̃R)
=⇒ w̃L =
ṽA
N + 1− ṽA
(N + 1− w̃R)
Let γ
def









(1− γ)(N + 1− w̃R)(w̃R − w̃L).
We now want to prove that the above expression is Ω(ε). We begin with the term 1− γ:
1− γ = N + 1− 2ṽA
N + 1− ṽA
.
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Using the results of Step 1 as earlier, we can assume ṽA ∈ [0.15N, 0.35N ]. We get 1− γ = Θ(1).
We now turn to the rest of the expression, namely:
2
N(N + 1)
(N + 1− w̃R)(w̃R − w̃L).
Our goal is to show that that expression is Ω(ε). We distinguish two cases.
• Case 1: w̃R ≤ 3N/4. In that case it is clear that N + 1 − w̃R = Ω(N), so it suffices to show
w̃R−w̃L = Ω(εN). Recall we are assuming val(r) ≥ ṽA, and since the statement of the lemma only
considers records for which |val(r)− ṽA| > εN/4, it follows that val(r) ≥ ṽA + εN/4. On the other
hand using Lemma C.3, we are free to assume |ṽA − vA| ≤ εN/4, which implies val(r) ≥ vA. This
allows us to apply Lemma C.6 to get |val(r)− w̃R| ≤ εN/8. In turn, this implies w̃R ≥ ṽA + εN/8.
Since w̃L ≤ ṽA by construction, we get w̃R − w̃L = Ω(εN) as desired.
• Case 2: w̃R > 3N/4. In that case since w̃L ≤ ṽA, and as previously we can use the results
of Step 1 to get ṽA ≤ 0.4, it is clear that w̃R − w̃L = Ω(N). Hence it suffices to show that
N + 1 − w̃R = Ω(εN). Like in the previous case we can enforce |val(r) − w̃R| ≤ εN/8, and since
the statement of the lemma only considers records such that val(r) ≤ N + 1− εN , it follows that
N + 1− w̃R = Ω(εN) as desired.
From the previous reasoning, we conclude that p(w̃R) − p(w̃L) = Ω(ε). Since c8 is a constant the
result follows.
Putting all the lemmas from Step 3 so far together, we get the following result.
















queries, the following event holds simultaneously for all records r, except with probability at most δ:
if val(r) 6∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ]
∪ [ṽA − εN/4, ṽA + εN/4]
then Algorithm 6 returns w̃L iff val(r) ≤ ṽA.
Proof. The proof follows directly from combining Lemmas C.9 and C.10, where we choose any constants
c7 and c8 such that c8 > 2c7.
Putting everything together. We now combine the previous three steps to prove Theorem C.1. We
have already explained at the start of the section how to handle the reflection symmetry, by assuming
vA ≤ N/2. To finish the proof, we need to show that condition (1) in the definition of sacrificial ε-
approximate reconstruction holds (whp after the claimed number of queries). To that end let us consider
a record r with val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1 − εN,N ]. We need to ensure |est-val(r) − val(r)| < εN . We
distinguish two cases.
• Case 1: |val(r) − ṽA| ≤ εN/4. By Lemma C.6, we can ensure that one of x = w̃L or x = w̃R
satisfies |val(r)− x| ≤ εN/4. We get |x− ṽA| ≤ εN/2.
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On the other hand, using the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma C.10, we can show:
w̃L − ṽA = −γ(w̃R − ṽA)
where γ = ṽA/(N + 1 − ṽA) = Θ(1). It follows that |x − ṽA| = O(εN) actually implies both
|w̃L−ṽA| = O(εN) and |w̃R−ṽA| = O(εN). Hence |w̃R−w̃L| = O(εN). Since |val(r)−x| = O(εN),
we deduce that both w̃L and w̃R are within O(εN) of val(r). Hence whichever of the two values
Theorem C.1 returns is correct within O(εN). In particular by setting small enough constants
ci’s it is correct within εN .
• Case 2: |val(r) − ṽA| > εN/4. We assume val(r) ≥ ṽA; the other case is very similar. By
Lemma C.3 we can enforce |ṽA − vA| ≤ εN/4, so we can deduce val(r) ≥ vA. By Lemma C.6,
choosing small enough c4, we get |val(r)− w̃R| < εN . On the other hand by Lemma C.11, we have
that Algorithm 6 returns w̃R, so we are done.
This concludes the proof of Theorem C.1.
D Query Complexity of ApproxOrder
Preliminaries
General notation.
• If S is a set and f is a mapping whose domain includes S, then f(S) def= {f(s) : s ∈ S}.
• For a set or multiset S, #S denotes the cardinality of S. If S is a multiset, cardinality includes
multiplicity. In particular, whenever we write something of the form #{[x, y] ∈ QR : P (x, y)} for
some property P , multiplicity should be taken into account.
Records and values.
• QR denotes the sequence of queried ranges. Q is the sequence of access pattern leakage for all
queries, i.e. Q is the sequence of record sets that match each range in QR. While both Q and QR
are defined as sequences, we will often regard them as multisets, and write e.g. [x, y] ∈ QR. We
will also (somewhat abusively) call Q the set of queries.
• For V a set of values, the diameter of V is defined as:
diam(V )
def
= max{y − x : x, y ∈ V }.
The diameter of a set of records S is defined as diam(val(S)).
Order on records.
• If r, s are records, we write r < s iff val(r) < val(s), and likewise for ≤. We call < the real order
on records (as in: the order induced by the actual record values). (This is technically a small
abuse of terminology, since two distinct records with the same value satisfy r ≤ s and s ≤ r, so ≤
is a total preoder and not an order, but this is irrelevant for our purpose: for simplicity, we will
call total preorders orders throughout this work.)
• The notation  will be used to denote orders on records, with ≺ being the corresponding strict
order. In particular ≺ will always denote the strict variant of the order. Since this notation avoids
any ambiguity regarding the strictness of the order, we will also call ≺ an order.
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• We say that an order ≺ on records is compatible with Q iff all elements of Q are intervals for ≺.
That is, for every q ∈ Q, there exist two records aq, bq such that q = {r : aq  r  bq}.
• We say that an order ≺ on records matches the real order up to reflection on a set of records
r1, . . . , rk iff either: (1) ∀i 6= j, ri < rj ⇔ ri ≺ rj ; or (2) ∀i 6= j, ri < rj ⇔ ri  rj .
• If A,B are sets of values, we write A < B iff:
∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, a < b.
The notation is naturally extended to sets of records via val: S < T iff val(S) < val(T ). Note that
if either set is empty, the statement is vacuously true.
PQ-trees.
• If T is a PQ-tree, and T is a node of T , then the leaves of T are defined as the leaves of the
subtree rooted at T , and denoted leaf(T ).
• If T is a PQ-tree, and T1, . . . , Tk are nodes of T , then the meet of T1, . . . , Tk, denoted meet(T1, . . . , Tk),
is the deepest node of T whose descendants contain all Ti’s. If A is a set of nodes, meet(A) is the
meet of the elements of A.
• If T is a PQ-tree, root(T ) is the root of T .
• For S, T two nodes of a tree, S ≤ T means that S is a descendant of T . In general, we view trees
as having their root at the top; and so if S ≤ T we may say that S is lower (or deeper) than T .
D.1 Algorithm
Throughout, we assume εN is a strictly positive integer3. For convenience, we recall the ApproxOrder
attack in Algorithm 7.
Below, we restate the success condition of sacrificial ε-approximate order reconstruction (sacrificial
ε-AOR) in terms of the output of Algorithm 7.
Definition D.1. Given a target precision ε ∈]0, 1/4], we say that the ApproxOrder procedure defined
in Algorithm 7 succeeds iff its output A1, . . . , Ak satisfies the following three properties:
1. ∀i, diam(Ai) < εN .
2. A1 < · · · < Ak holds up to reflection.
3. For all r 6∈
⋃
Ai, val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ].
Recall that we require two hypotheses, h2 and h3, for the success of the algorithm. These hypotheses
are restated below for convenience.
• Hypothesis h2 requires that there exist two records with values a and b such that a, b ∈ [N/4, 3N/4],
and b−a ≥ N/3 (what really matters for the proof to go through is that a, b should be Ω(N) away
from 1, N and each other); and additionally that there exist at least three records with values
within [εN,N + 1− εN ] that are more than εN away from each other (note that a and b can be
two of these values).
3This is without loss of generality, because the relevant quantity in the definition of sacrificial ε-AOR is dεNe (much
like sacrificial ε-ADR). That is, εN can be replaced by dεNe everywhere in the definition, and this does not affect whether
it is satisfied.
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Algorithm 7 Approximate order algorithm.
ApproxOrder(Q):
Input: Set of queries Q.
Output: Disjoint subsets of records A1, . . . , Ak.
1: T ← PQ-tree built from Q.
2: T ← FindNodeT(T , root(T ))
3: C1, . . . , Ck ← children of T (in order)
4: return leaf(C1), . . . , leaf(Ck)
FindNodeT(T , S):
Input: PQ-tree T and node S of T .
Output: Deepest node S′ ≤ S with > R/2 leaves.
1: R← |leaf(root(T ))|
2: for each child C of S do
3: if |leaf(T , C)| > R/2 then




• Hypothesis h3 requires that a strict majority of all records have a value within [εN,N + 1− εN ],
and that no range of length εN contains the values of a (strict) majority of all records.
We are now in a position to state our main result.

















queries, Algorithm 7 succeeds with probability at least 1− δ.
The proof of Theorem D.2 is given in the next section.
Remark. Intuitively what we are showing is that when building a PQ-tree from uniform ranges,
assuming some fairly mild hypotheses expressed by h2 and h3 about the database not being overly
sparse or overly concentrated on a few values, then quite quickly the PQ-tree contains a Q-node near
the root that provides a considerable amount of information about the order (each of its children has
small diameter, their order is known since it is a Q-node, and collectively they contain all values save
a small fraction near 1 and N). Moreover that Q-node can be located easily because it is the deepest
node containing a strict majority of records.
D.2 Analysis
Fix a target precision ε < 1/4, a set of queries Q and let T denote the PQ-tree built from Q. We assume
hypotheses h2 and h3 are satisfied, in particular there exist two records ra and rb with respective values
a, b such that a, b ∈ [N/4, 3N/4] and b − a ≥ N/3. We assimilate each record occuring in Q with the
corresponding leaf of T . Let T def= meet(ra, rb).
The proof of Theorem D.2 will proceed as follows. First, we will define a collection of events whose
intersection E implies that Algorithm 7 succeeds. Then we will show that E is satisfied after the claimed
number of queries (except with probability δ). More precisely, the proof is composed of the following
three claims.
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Claim D.3. If E occurs and h2 holds, then letting C1, . . . , Ck be the children of T and Ai = leaf(Ci)
for all i, then A1, . . . , Ak is a successful output for algorithm ApproxOrder; that is:
1. ∀i, diam(Ai) < εN .
2. A1 < · · · < Ak holds up to reflection.
3. For all r 6∈
⋃
Ai, val(r) ∈ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ].

















queries, E holds with probability at least 1− δ.
It is clear that claims D.3 to D.5 together imply Theorem D.2. We now define the event E. We will
then prove claims D.3 to D.5 in appendices D.3 to D.5 respectively.
Before continuing, a few more definitions are needed.
g = bεN/2c.
d = bεN/2c = g.
kL = da/ge − 1.
kM = d(b− a)/ge.
kR = d(N + 1− b)/ge − 1.
We now define various sub-intervals of [1, N ] which we will call buckets.
BLi = [1 + i · g, 1 + (i+ 1) · g[ for 1 ≤ i < kL.
BMRi = ]b− (i+ 1) · g, b− i · g] for 1 ≤ i < kM .
BRi = [N − (i+ 1) · g,N − i · g[ for 1 ≤ i < kR.
The event E will be defined as the intersection of a number of simple events, defined as follows.
Ea: ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ∈]a− g, a], y ≥ b.
Eb: ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ≤ a, y ∈ [b, b+ g[.
EL: ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ≤ d, y ∈ [a, b[.
ER: ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ∈]a, b], y ≥ N + 1− d.
EB,Li : ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ∈ BLi , y ≥ a.
EB,Ri : ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ≤ b, y ∈ BRi .
EB,LM : ∃[x, y] ∈ QR, x ≤ a, y + 1 ∈ EB,MR0 .
















EB,M : EB,LM ∩ EB,MR.
We can finally define:
E
def
= Ea ∩ Eb ∩ EL ∩ ER ∩ EB,L ∩ EB,M ∩ EB,R.
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D.3 Proof of Claim D.3
Throughout this proof, we assume event E occurs, and h2 holds. Our goal is to prove the conclusion
of Claim D.3.
We now give names to some values that witness the occurence of events that make up E.
• Because Ea holds, there exists a queried range [sLM , s′LM ] with sLM ∈]a− g, a] and s′LM ≥ b. We
pick sLM as high as possible among possible choices.
• Because Eb holds, there exists a queried range [s′MR, sMR] with sMR ∈ [b, b+ g[ and s′MR ≤ a. We
pick sMR as low as possible among possible choices.
• Because EL holds, there exists a queried range [λ0, λ′0] with λ0 ≤ d and λ′0 ∈ [a, b[.
• Because ER holds, there exists a queried range [ρ′0, ρ0] with ρ0 ≥ N + 1− d and ρ′0 ∈]a, b].
• Because EB,L holds, for all 1 ≤ i < kL there exists a queried range [λi, λ′i] with λi ∈ BLi and
λ′i ≥ a. The λi’s may be regarded as splitting values to the left of a into subranges of length less
than 2g.
• Because EB,R holds, for all 1 ≤ i < kR there exists a queried range [ρ′i, ρi] with ρi ∈ BRi and
ρ′i ≤ b. The ρi’s may be regarded as splitting values to the right of b into subranges of length less
than 2g.
• Because EB,LM holds, there exists a queried range [µ′0, µ0 − 1] with µ0 ∈ BMR0 and µ′0 ≤ a.
• Because EB,MR holds, for all 1 ≤ i < kM there exists a queried range [µi, µ′i] with µi ∈ BMRi and
µ′i ≥ b. The µi’s may be regarded as splitting values between a and b into subranges of length less
than 2g.
It is worth noting that the situation between the λi’s and the ρi’s is completely symmetric by
reflection. The same holds between a and b, and between sLM and sMR. We will sometimes use this
fact in the upcoming proofs to avoid repeating the same reasoning for both λi’s and ρi’s.
Let us consider the sequence of values:
(λ0, λ1, . . . , λkL−1, sLM , µkM−1, . . . , µ0,
sMR + 1, ρkR−1 + 1, . . . , ρ1 + 1, ρ0 + 1).
From the above sequence, we perform the following actions:
• If λkL−1 ≥ sLM , remove λkL−1 from the sequence.
• If sLM ≥ µkM−1, remove µkM−1 from the sequence.
• If sMR + 1 ≥ ρkR−1 + 1, remove ρkR−1 + 1 from the sequence.
We call the resulting sequence P and denote its elements (in order) by p1, . . . , pnP . Let us define
Pi
def
= [pi, pi+1[ for 1 ≤ i < nP . The elements we just removed from the sequence ensure that it is
strictly increasing. In fact P is built so that it essentially satisfies the conclusion of Claim D.3, as
expressed by Lemma D.7 below. Before proving that lemma, we begin with a few minor facts about
the pi’s.
Lemma D.6. The following holds.
1. λkL−2 < sLM .
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2. µkM−2 > a.
3. ρkR−2 > sMR.
4. Let i such that Pi contains a. Then if µkM−1 > a, Pi = [sLM , µkM−1[; otherwise Pi = [sLM , µkM−2[.
5. Let i such that Pi contains b. Then Pi = [µ0, sMR + 1[.
6. The sequence P is strictly increasing.
Proof. Proof of item 1.
λkL−2 < 1 + (kL − 1)g
= 1 + (da/ge − 2)g
< 1 + a− g
≤ sLM .
Proof of item 2.
µkM−2 > b− (kM − 1)g
= b− (d(b− a)/ge − 1)g
> a.
Proof of item 3. This is the symmetric of item 1 via the reflection symmetry.
Proof of item 4. By item 1 above, λkL−2 < sLM , and by construction of P , if λkL−1 ≥ sLM , λkL−1
was removed from the sequence. It follows that all λi’s in the sequence are strictly less than sLM .
Moreover observe that if µkM−1 ≤ a, then [µkM−1, µ′kM−1] is a queried range that contains a and b, and
hence by construction of M we have sLM ≥ µkM−1. Moreover in that case, by construction of P , µkM−1
was removed from the sequence. Combining this observation with item 2, we deduce that all µi’s in the
sequence are strictly more than a. Since all λi’s in the sequence are strictly less than sLM , and all µi’s
in the sequnce are strictly more than a, item 4 follows.
Proof of item 5. It is clear that all µi’s are less than b by construction, and sMR ≥ b by construction.
Combining this with item 3, we deduce item 5.
Proof of item 6. We have shown so far that all λi’s in the sequence are strictly less than sLM ; all
µi’s in the sequence are strictly more than a ≥ sLM ; all µi’s are less than b < sMR+ 1; and using item 3
all ρi + 1’s in the sequence are strictly more than sMR. Combining these results with the observation
that by construction the λi’s are strictly increasing; the µi’s are strictly decreasing; and the ρi’s are also
strictly decreasing, we deduce that the sequence P is strictly increasing.
Lemma D.7. P satisfies the following three properties:
1. P is strictly increasing.
2. ∀i, pi+1 − pi ≤ εN .
3.
⋃
Pi forms an interval such that [1, N ] \
⋃
Pi ⊆ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ].
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Proof. We have already shown in Lemma D.6 that P is strictly increasing.
We continue by proving the third point. It is clear that
⋃
Pi forms an interval, by construction of
the Pi’s; and since λ0 ≤ d ≤ εN/2, and ρ0 ≥ N + 1− d ≥ N + 1− εN/2, we have that [1, N ] \
⋃
Pi ⊆
[1, εN/2[∪]N + 1− εN/2, N ] ⊆ [1, εN [∪]N + 1− εN,N ] as desired4.
It remains to show that ∀i, pi+1 − pi ≤ εN . This is true whenever the pi values both correspond to
λi’s (resp. µi’s, ρi’s) in the sequence P : indeed consecutive λi’s (resp. µi’s, ρi’s) belong to consecurive
buckets of size g ≤ εN/2, and hence are at most εN apart. Hence we only need to prove something for
edge cases, i.e. whenever pi or pi+1 is equal to either sLM or sMR. This leads to four cases.
Case 1 : pi = sLM . In the proof of item 4 in Lemma D.6, we have already observed that sLM ≥
µkM−1, so pi+1 − pi = pi+1 − sLM ≤ pi+1 − µkM−1. Using Lemma D.6 item 4, pi+1 is either µkM−1 or
µkM−2, so the conclusion follows.
Case 2 : pi+1 = sLM . In that case, either we have pi = λkL−1, and so:
pi+1 − pi = sLM − λkL−1
≤ a− (1 + (da/ge − 2)g)
< 2g
≤ εN.
The other case is that λkL−1 was removed from the sequence, whence pi = λkL−2. However by construc-
tion of P , this only happens if λkL−1 ≥ sLM , and in that case pi+1−pi = sLM−λkL−2 ≤ λkL−1−λkL−2 ≤
2g.
Case 3 : pi = sMR. This case is the symmetric of the case pi+1 = sLM just above via the reflection
symmetry.
Case 4 : pi+1 = sMR. In that case pi = µ0, and we have:
pi+1 − pi = sMR − µ0
< b+ g − (b− g)
= 2g.
This concludes the proof.
Informally, the partition of records induced by P is “good enough” to satisfy the conclusion of
Claim D.3. In the remainder of the proof, we show that, roughly speaking, the partition induced by the
children of node T must be a refinement of P . Hence we will be able to deduce that they satisfy the
same three properties, which will conclude the proof.
Recall that ra, rb denote records with respective value a and b (which exist by the assumption h2).
Recall that the real order on records is the one induced by their values (i.e. the order we are trying to
approximately reconstruct).
Lemma D.8. Let r denote a record such that val(r), a, b belong to distinct Pi’s. Then for every order
≺ on records compatible with Q, ≺ must match the real order on r, ra, rb up to reflection.
Proof. Let x = val(r). Since a < b there are only three possibilities for the position of x relative to a
and b: x < a, a < x < b or b < x.
Case 1 : x < a. We have x ≥ λ0 by construction of P . It follows that x ∈ [λ0, λ′0] with λ′0 ∈ [a, b[.
By Lemma D.6 item 4, we have that x < sLM , so x 6∈ [sLM , s′LM ]. Thus, we have exhibited two queried
4It may be observed that we are proving something a little stronger that what is required. Informally, we are only
sacrificing values within εN/2 of 1 and N , rather than within εN . Proving the stronger statement makes the proof slightly
easier, and does not affect the final result (this is because the upper bound we eventually prove is up to a constant).
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ranges (namely [λ0, λ
′
0] and [sLM , s
′
LM ]) such that the first range matches r and ra but not rb; and
the second matches ra and rb but not r. Any order on records compatible with these two ranges must
satisfy that ra is (strictly) between r and rb. Hence any order compatible with Q matches the real order
up to reflection.
Case 2 : a < x < b. Using Lemma D.6 items 2 and 4, we have x > µi > a (where i ∈ {kM−1, kM−2});
and on the other hand x < µ0. Hence [µi, µ
′
i] is a queried range that contains a and x but not b; and
[µ′0, µ0] is a queried range that contains x and b but not a. Hence any order compatible with Q must
satisfy that r is (strictly) between ra and rb.
Case 3 : b < x. This is the symmetric of the first case by the reflection symmetry.
Lemma D.9. Let rx, ry denote two records such that val(rx), val(ry), a, b all belong to distinct Pi’s.
Then for every order ≺ on records compatible with Q, ≺ must match the real order on ra, rb, rx, ry up
to reflection.
Proof. Let x = val(rx) and y = val(ry). Without loss of generality x < y. If x and y are separated by
either a or b (or both), then Lemma D.8 suffices to conclude. Hence we can restrict to attention to the
following three cases: x < y < a, a < x < y < b, and b < x < y. Let ≺ denote an arbitrary order
compatible with Q.
Case 1 : x < y < a. Because [λ0, λ
′
0] is a queried range containing a but not b, we must have
either ra ≺ rb or rb ≺ ra (otherwise we have both ra  rb and rb  ra, which implies any interval
for  contains a iff it contains b, which implies ≺ is not compatible with the queried range [λ0, λ′0],
a contradiction). Since we are only trying to prove something on ≺ up to reflection, we are free to
assume ra ≺ rb (reversing ≺ if necessary). Since x and y are assumed to be in distinct Pi’s, and using
Lemma D.6 item 4, x and y must be in distinct buckets BLi ’s, and there exists λi in the sequence P such
that x < λi ≤ y. Because [λ0, λ′0] contains x and a, but not b; and [sLM , s′LM ] contains a and b but not
x; we have that records with values in [λ0, λ
′
0], and records with values in [sLM , s
′
LM ], are two queries in
Q, both containing ra, and both containing a point the other does not contain (rx and rb respectively).
It follows that records with values in [λ0, sLM [ must form a range for ≺ (indeed the set difference of
two ranges in the previous configuration is always a range). Thus records in [λ0, sLM [ form a range for
≺ that contains rx and ry but not a; while records with values in [λi, λ′i] form a range that contains ry
and a but not rx. It follows that rx ≺ ry ≺ a and we are done (the reverse order is impossible due to
Lemma D.8 and the assumption ra ≺ rb).
Case 2 : a < x < y < b. Using Lemma D.6 items 4 and 5 and the fact that x and y are in distinct
Pi’s, there must exist i > 0 such that [µi, µ
′
i] contains y and b but not a (note that by Lemma D.6 item 4,
both x and y must be less than µ0, whence i > 0). On the other hand, [µ
′
0, µ0] contains x and y but
not b. Hence we conclude that x ≺ y ≺ b holds up to reflection. Combining this with Lemma D.8 yields
the conclusion.
Case 3 : b < x < y. This is the symmetric of the first case by the reflection symmetry.
Lemma D.10. Let r1, r2, r3 denote three records such that val(r1), val(r2), val(r3) belong to distinct
Pi’s. Then for every order ≺ on records compatible with Q, ≺ must match the real order on r1, r2, r2
up to reflection.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Lemma D.9.
Lemma D.11. Let Qi denote the set of records whose value lies in Pi. For every order ≺ on records
compatible with Q, Q1 ≺ · · · ≺ QnP holds up to reflection.
Proof. It is enough to show this property for three distinct Qi’s. It is then a direct corollary of
Lemma D.10.
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The following two lemmas express general properties of PQ-trees.
Lemma D.12. Let r1, . . . , rk denote k ≥ 3 records, and assume for every order ≺ compatible with Q,
r1 ≺ · · · ≺ rk holds up to reflection. Let S = meet(r1, . . . , rk). Then the following holds:
1. S is a Q-node.
2. ∀i 6= j,meet(ri, rj) = S.
Proof. We first prove the second item. Pick distinct ri, rj and assume towards contradiction that
meet(ri, rj) = S
′ with S′ < S (for the tree order). Since meet(r1, . . . , rk) = S > S
′, there must exist rh
such that meet(ri, rh) > S
′. This means the PQ-tree is compatible with both the order ri ≺ rj ≺ rh;
and with the order rj ≺ ri ≺ rh. These two orders are not reflections of each other, which yields a
contradiction. It follows that meet(ri, rj) < S is impossible and we are done.
We now turn to proving the first item. Observe that the second item implies that every ri belongs
to a distinct child of S (in fact it is equivalent). If S were a P-node, all orders between the k records
would be compatible with the tree. Since we assume r1 ≺ · · · ≺ rk, and k ≥ 3, this is impossible. It
follows that S is a Q-node.
Lemma D.13. Let A1, . . . , Ak denote non-empty subsets of records with k ≥ 3, and assume for every
order ≺ compatible with Q, A1 ≺ · · · ≺ Ak holds up to reflection. Let A =
⋃
Ai, and let S = meet(A).
Then for every child C of S, either leaf(C) ∩A = ∅, or ∃i, leaf(C) ⊆ Ai.
The conclusion of the lemma may be expressed as: the partition induced by the children of S refines
A1, . . . , Ak.
Proof. Let C be a child of S, and L = leaf(C). Assume leaf(C)∩A 6= ∅. Assume towards contradiction
∃i 6= j, L∩Ai 6= ∅∧L∩Aj 6= ∅. Let r1 ∈ L∩Ai and r2 ∈ L∩Aj . Since S = meet(A) and S > C, there
must exist a record r ∈ A \ L. In that case the PQ-tree is compatible with both the order r1 ≺ r2 ≺ r;
and with the order r2 ≺ r1 ≺ r. These two orders are not reflections of each other, which yields a
contradiction. It follows that L cannot have a non-empty intersection with two distinct Ai’s, and we
are done.
We now have all the tools needed to finish the proof of Claim D.3. Let Qi denote the set of records
whose value lies in Pi. By assumption h2, there exist at least three records with values in ]εN, (1− ε)N ]
that are at least εN apart. It follows that there exist at least three distinct non-empty Qi’s.
Combining Lemmas D.11 and D.12, we can deduce the crucial fact that meet(
⋃
Qi) = meet(ra, rb) =
T .
Let C1, . . . , CnC denote the children of T and Ai = leaf(Ci) for all i. In order to prove Claim D.3,
we need to prove three facts about the Ai’s. We prove each in turn.
Fact 1 : ∀i, diam(Ai) < εN . By Lemma D.13, either Ai is contained in one of the Qj ’s, or it is
disjoint from
⋃
Qj . In the first case, By Lemma D.7, we have diam(Ai) < εN as desired. In the second
case, by Lemma D.7 and the fact that ra 6∈ Ai, we have that val(Ai) is contained either in [1, εN [, or in
]N + 1− εN,N ]. In either case we also get diam(Ai) < εN .
Fact 2 : A1 < · · · < Ak holds up to reflection. By Lemma D.12, T is a Q-node, so this holds.
Fact 3 : val(
⋃
Ai) forms an interval such that [1, N ] \ val(
⋃





Qi) satisfies this property, and since meet(
⋃
Qi) = T ,
⋃
Qi ⊆ leaf(T ) =
⋃
Ai
so we are done.
This concludes the proof of Claim D.3.
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D.4 Proof of Claim D.4
Let S be the node output by FindNodeT(Q, T , root(T )) in Algorithm 7. We want to prove S = T .
Since Claim D.4 assumes E occurs, we can apply Claim D.3 to deduce that the node T contains
all records whose value lies in ]εN, (1 − ε)N ]; and that all of its children contain values at most εN
from each other. By assumption h3, a strict majority of records have their value in ]εN, (1 − ε)N ], so
T contains a strict majority of records. By the same assumption, no interval of length εN contains a
majority of records, so no child of T can contain a majority of records. It follows that the nodes of the
tree containing a (strict) majority of records are exactly T and its ancestors. By construction of S, we
deduce that S = T .
D.5 Proof of Claim D.5
The claim is a direct application of the ε-net theorem. Define the ground set as the set of all ranges in
[1, N ], with the uniform distribution. The concept set is defined as follows: each choice of a < b < c < d
in [1, N ] yields one concept {[x, y] : x ∈ [a, b], y ∈ [c, d]}. We claim that the concept space has finite VC
dimension. It suffices to show that its growth function is polynomially bounded (in fact it is equivalent).
Given n ranges within [1, N ], the 2n endpoints of the ranges induce a partition of [1, N ] into at most
2n + 1 sub-intervals. This yields at most (2n + 1)4 choices for the values a, b, c, d (indeed any two
choices of those four values that do not modify the sub-interval that each value belongs to does not
change the resulting concept). Hence the growth function is polynomially bounded, and we are done.
It is straightforward to check that events Ea, Eb, EL and ER all belong to that concept space, and
have probability Θ(1). Likewise all events EB,Li , E
B,R
i , E
B,LM , EB,MRi belong to the same concept
space, and have probability Θ(ε); moreover in each case the probability does not depend on i. It follows
that in order for all these events to hold simultaneously, it is enough to have a Cε-net on the previous
concept space, for some constant C > 0 (namely pick C so that Cε lower-bounds the probability of all
previous events). By the ε-net theorem, we get the desired result.
E Generic Query Complexity Lower Bounds
E.1 Lower Bound for Sacrificial ε-ADR
Notation.
• For a probabilty a ∈ [0, 1], let B(a) denote a Bernoulli trial with probability of success a (i.e. a
coin flip with probability of heads a).
• Given two probability distributions P and Q, δ(P,Q) denotes the statistical distance between P
and Q.
• Likewise, DKL(P,Q) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between P and Q. By a small abuse
of notation, given a, b ∈]0, 1[, we write DKL(a, b) for DKL(B(a), B(b)).
The “counterexamples” we use to prove the lower bounds are very similar to those of the Ω(N4)
lower bound found in [KKNO16], although the technique we use to prove the bounds themselves is
vastly different. We note that Proposition E.2 implies the previously cited bound (as full reconstruction
is equivalent to sacrificial 1/N -approximate reconstruction).
Lemma E.1. Let 0 < a < 1 be a constant, let ε < 1− a, and let Q be an integer representing a number
of samples. Then the advantage of a computationally unbounded adversary trying to distinguish B(a)Q
from B(a + ε)Q is O(
√
Qε). In particular, if the adversary has a constant distinguishing advantage,






















































To conclude, recall that the statistical distance is an (exact) upper bound on the advantage of any
distinguisher.
We first prove a lower bound on sacrificial ε-approximate reconstruction.
Proposition E.2. Let ε < 1/5 such that εN > 0 is an integer. Assume a uniform distribution on
range queries. Consider a (computationally unbounded) adversary achieving sacrificial ε-Approximate
Reconstruction for all databases, and failing with probability at most δ < 1/2 (over the choice of queries).
Then the adversary must require Ω(ε−4) queries.
Proof. For simplicity we assume N is odd. Consider two databases DB1 and DB2 as follows. All records
in DB1 have the same value v1 = (N + 1)/2. All records in DB2 have value v2 = (N + 1)/2 + 2εN + 1.




k(N + 1− k).
Querying database DB1 with a range query either yields all records, or none. It constitutes a Bernoulli
trial B(p(v1)). Likewise, querying DB2 with uniform queries yields a Bernoulli trial B(p(v2)).
Now the key fact is that a successful sacrificial ε-ADR adversary cannot output the same database
for DB1 and DB2. This is because the (single) value in each database is 2εN + 1 away from the value
of the other database, and neither value is within εN of 1 or N ; hence the value of any given record in
the reconstructed database output by the adversary can only be compatible with one of DB1 or DB2.














A direct application of Lemma E.1 yields that Ω(ε−4) queries are necessary.
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We now turn to sacrificial ε-approximate reconstruction in presence of the hypothesis h1. Recall
that h1 states the existence of a record with (symmetric) value within [0.2N, 0.3N ].
Proposition E.3. Let ε < 1/20 such that εN > 0 is an integer. Assume a uniform distribution on
range queries. Consider a (computationally unbounded) adversary achieving sacrificial ε-Approximate
Reconstruction for all databases satisfying h1, and failing with probability at most δ < 1/2 (over the
choice of queries). Then the adversary must require Ω(ε−2) queries.
Proof. The reasoning is the same as in the proof of Proposition E.2, choosing slightly different databases
DB1 and DB2. For simplicity we assume N is a multiple of 4. Consider two databases DB1 and
DB2 as follows. All records in DB1 have the same value v1 = N/4. All records in DB2 have value
v2 = N/4 + 2εN + 1.
Querying database DB1 (resp. DB2) yields a Bernoulli trial B(p(v1)) (resp. B(p(v2))). Like in
the proof of Proposition E.2, a successful ε-ADR adversary yields a distinguisher between B(p(v1))
Q
and B(p(v2))
Q. Moreover DB1 and DB2 both satisfy h1, so the reasoning still holds if the adversary is
restricted to databases satisfying h1.




(N + 1− 2v2 − (v1 − v2))
≤ 2(v2 − v1)
N
= O(ε).
A direct application of Lemma E.1 yields that Ω(ε−2) queries are necessary.
E.2 Lower Bound for Sacrificial ε-AOR
Recall that sacrificial ε-AOR succeeds iff the attacker is able to split the set of records into disjoint





1. Sacrificed records have value within εN of 1 or N . That is, the values of records not in B are
within [1, εN ] ∪ [(1− ε)N + 1, N ].
2. The diameter (i.e. the largest pairwise difference of values) within each bucket is less than εN .
Formally, ∀i, diam(Bi) < εN .
3. The attackers knows the order of records belonging to distinct buckets (up to reflection). Formally,
it holds that either B1 < B2 < · · · < Bk, or B1 > B2 > · · · > Bk (where “Bi < Bj” denotes
∀x ∈ Bi,∀y ∈ Bj , val(x) < val(y)).
We now state our generic lower bound result for sacrificial ε-AOR.
Proposition E.4. Let ε < 1/4 such that εN > 0 is an integer. Assume a uniform distribution on
range queries. Consider a (computationally unbounded) adversary achieving sacrificial ε-AOR for all
databases, and failing with probability at most δ < 1/2 (over the choice of queries). Then the adversary
must require Ω(ε−1 log ε−1) queries.
Before proving Proposition E.4, we introduce two lemmas. The first lemma is a variant of the coupon
collector’s problem.
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Lemma E.5. Let C denote a set of coupons, among which are n distinguished coupons for some
n ≤ |C|. Let π denote a probability distribution on C. At each round of the experiment, one coupon is
drawn from C according to π. Let η > 0 be a constant. Assume that after Q rounds, with probability at
least η, all n distinguished coupons have been collected. Then it must hold that Q = Ω(n log n).
Remark. The result holds regardless of the underlying distribution π.
Proof. We prove the result by progressing from a more restricted case towards the full statement in
three steps. At each step except the first one, we will reduce the problem to an instance of the previous
step. Throughout, T is the random variable denoting the number of rounds after which all distinguished
coupons have been collected (for the first time). What we want to prove is that Pr[T ≤ Q] ≥ η implies
Q = Ω(n log n). For simplicity we assume n is even (the case of odd n is similar).
Step 1. In this first step, we assume that all coupons are distinguished, and have the same probability
1/n. Then we are faced with an instance of the standard coupon collector’s problem. By standard




i=1 1/i = Θ(log n) denotes the harmonic series, and Var[T ] <
π2n2/6. Using Chebyshev’s inequality it follows that Pr[T ≤ nHn/2] = o(1), which implies Q =
Ω(nHn) = Ω(n log n) and we are done.
Step 2. In this second step, we lift previous restrictions, and instead assume that all distinguished
coupons have probability at most 1/n. Then it is clear that the number of rounds necessary to collect
all distinguished coupons with probability at least η can only be higher than in the previous case, since
every distinguished coupon has lower probability. Hence the result still holds.
Step 3. In this final step, we lift all restrictions and consider the general case. Let n′ denote
the number of distinguished coupons that have probability at most 2/n. By the pigeonhole principle,
n′ ≥ n/2 (otherwise we would have > n/2 coupons with probability > 2/n, so the total probability mass
would be> 1, which is a contradiction). Hence we can choose n/2 coupons among distinguished coupons,
such that they each have probability at most 2/n. We can now apply the result of Step 2, where the
n/2 chosen coupons play the role of distinguished coupons, to deduce that Ω(n/2 log n/2) = Ω(n log n)
rounds are necessary to collect all chosen (a fortiori, distinguished) coupons with probability at least
η.
We now state the second lemma, which contains the bulk of the argument.
Lemma E.6. Let I1, . . . , In denote n disjoint sub-intervals of [1, N ]. Assume Q range queries are
drawn uniformly at random in [1, N ], forming a set of queried ranges QR. Let η > 0 denote a constant,
and assume that the following statement holds with probability at least η: each interval Ii is split by a
queried range, in the following sense:
∀i ≤ n,∃q ∈ QR, Ii ∩ q 6∈ {∅, Ii}.
Then it must hold that Q = Ω(n log n).
Remark. The result holds regardless of the choice of intervals, as long as they are disjoint.
Proof. Define ai, bi such that for all i, Ii = [ai, bi + 1]. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
each interval Ii has length at least two, i.e. bi ≥ ai. Indeed, it is otherwise impossible to split the
interval in two, as defined in the lemma statement, so the lemma becomes vacuous. For each i, define
Ci
def
= [ai, bi]. Notice that the Ci’s are still disjoint.
Observe that a queried range [x, y] splits an interval Ii in the sense of the the lemma iff either
x− 1 ∈ Ci or y ∈ Ci (or both). For a queried range [x, y], we are going to think of the events x− 1 ∈ Ci
and y ∈ Ci as collecting the i-th coupon (once either event has occured, the coupon is collected).
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From that standpoint, the lemma states that collecting all coupons with probability at least η implies
Ω(n log n) queries.
One important difference with a standard coupon collector’s problem is that at each step, a query
can split up to two intervals Ii. So at each step we can collect up to two coupons. Moreover the two
coupons we collect at a given step are not independent, since they are derived from the left and right
endpoint of the same query. The main idea, which we borrow from the lower bound proof in [LMP18],
is to replace the two dependent coupon draws from a given step by two independent draws, using the
following argument.
Let P denote the subsets of size at most two of [1, N−1]. The uniform distribution U on (non-empty)
ranges in [1, N ] induces a distribution f(U) on P defined by f : [x, y] 7→ {x− 1, y} \ {0, N}. A queried
range [x, y] collects the i-th coupon iff it splits Ii, equivalently, iff f([x, y]) intersects Ci. Our problem
can now be reformulated as follows: assume we have drawn Q elements of P according to D def= f(U).
Assume that with probability at least η, we have collected all coupons (i.e. for all i we have drawn an
element [x, y] such that f([x, y]) intersects Ci). Then we must have queried Ω(n log n) elements.
Now consider the distribution D′ on P induced by drawing two elements a and b independently
and uniformly at random from [1, N − 1], then taking their union {a, b} ∈ P . Define the probabilistic
mapping g : P → P by g(S) = S′ where:
if S = ∅, draw S′ ← D′;
if S = {s}
{
with probability N+24(N−1) set S
′ = S;
else S′ = {s, t} with t $←− [1, N − 1] \ {s};
if S = {s, t}, set S′ = S.
Claim E.7.
g(D) = D′.
Proof. The proof is given in [LMP18]. We reproduce it here for completeness. Observe that both D and
D′ are uniform on subsets of a given size. Hence it suffices to check that they match on subsets of size
0 and 1. For the first case, both distributions assign probability 0 to the empty set so we are done. For














This concludes the proof of the claim.
The point of the mapping g is that it only adds elements, i.e. for all S ∈ P , S ⊆ g(S) (regardless
of the coins used in g). As a consequence, the number of draws necessary to gather all coupons with
probability at least η can only be lower with distribution D′ = g(D) than with D. Hence in order to
prove our lower bound result for D (as is our goal), it is enough to prove it for D′.
That is, it is enough to prove the following statement: assume that with probability at least η, after
drawing Q elements of P according to D′, all coupons have been collected; then Q = Ω(n log n). Recall
that distribution D′ was induced by drawing two elements independently and uniformly at random, and
taking their union. Hence, drawing Q elements according to D′ and collecting all coupons is equivalent
to drawing 2Q elements in [1, N − 1] independently and uniformly at random, and having at least one
element within each interval Ci. We can now directly apply Lemma E.5 to get the result, where the
events x ∈ Ci (for x←$ [1, N − 1]) play the roles of the distinguished coupons.
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We can now prove the main result of the section.
Proof of Proposition E.4. The result must hold for all databases, so we are free to assume that the
database is dense (each value in [1, N ] is taken by at least one record). Let Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote n
disjoint sub-intervals within [1 + εN, (1− ε)N ], each of length ` def= εN + 2, with n = bN(1− 2ε)/`c. It
is straightforward to show that n = Ω(1/ε) (using εN ≥ 1 and ε < 1/4).
Now assume that the conditions of Lemma E.6 are not satisfied, i.e. there exists at least one interval
Ii that is not split. The crucial observation is that because Ii is not split by any queried range, all
records with value within Ii have the same access pattern leakage, i.e. they are hit by exactly the
same set of queries. In particular, by density there must exist two records r and r′ with respective
values v
def
= min(Ii) and v
′ def= max(Ii), so that their distance is v
′ − v > εN . Since these records
are indistinguishable given the query leakage (they are matched by exactly the same queries), in this
situation the adversary has no information about the order between records r and r′, so that it can
only correctly predict that order with probability 1/2. Since by assumption the adversary succeeds with
probability at least η > 1/2, it follows that the previous sitation, i.e. there existing an interval Ii not
split by any query, can only occur with probability at most 2(1 − η). Flipping this statement around,
it must be the case that with probability at least 2η− 1 > 0, all intervals are split. Hence we can apply
Lemma E.6 to deduce that Ω(n log n) = Ω(ε−1 log ε−1) queries are necessary.
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